So England are home and safe, out of the World Cup effectively after their second game, lingering only for a 0-0 draw against Costa Rica last Tuesday in a dead rubber match for both sides. In the midst of arguments that England’s players simply aren’t good enough, that the squad was too inexperienced this time round but will have gained for the future, or that – as Wayne Rooney hopelessly and absurdly suggested, echoed several days later by Alan Shearer – England are ‘too honest’ to succeed, there has been some talk of formations. Gary Lineker stressed before the tournament began that he didn’t want to see England playing with flat lines; but while the 4-2-3-1 formation which Roy Hodgson has consistently utilised as England manager appears removed from a traditional 4-4-2, Lineker concluded on England’s departure from Brazil that their 4-2-3-1 in fact offered little different:
‘The system that suits this kind of England better, with the lack of experience in it, is probably a 4-3-3 […] The problem with this 4-2-3-1 is that it very quickly becomes a 4-4-2 or at least a 4-4-1-1 and we end up with flat lines and people getting between us. I think we would have been better – and I said this before the tournament – with three midfield players because you’ve got to give yourself a chance defensively.’
The 4-3-3 and the 4-2-3-1 can be so closely related that the two formations become indistinguishable, or they can be decidedly distinct, depending on structure and personnel. Broadly, there are two ways of setting up a 4-3-3: with the midfield three in an upright triangle, where one midfielder adopts a more attacking role ahead of the other two; or with the midfielders in an inverted triangle, with one deeper player behind two more advanced, and often more mobile counterparts. If the triangle points forward, then the formation begins to resemble a 4-2-3-1. The difference remains in the distance between the more attacking midfield player and the lone striker, and in the position of the two wide players. In a 4-3-3, the two wide attackers typically play high up the pitch, usually stretching wide, often cutting inside to interchange with the striker and to provide a goalscoring threat. In a 4-2-3-1, the two wide attackers may occupy wide positions, but they may also play more narrowly, the three advanced midfielders even changing places through the course of the game so that each spends time in the centre of the pitch. The 4-2-3-1 therefore offers a degree of flexibility in so far as the wide attackers may be wingers, but they may also be advanced playmakers whose skills lie in passing and creating rather than dribbling and providing an incisive threat in the opposition penalty box.
Of course, if both wide attackers in a 4-2-3-1 function more as playmakers than as wingers, then the onus falls on the full-backs to provide width. If the two wide players are laden with defensive responsibilities, the 4-2-3-1 essentially becomes a 4-4-1-1, and not vastly different from a 4-4-2. On the other hand, an oft-stated problem with the 4-2-3-1 is that it can cause a schism between defence and attack, with the four attacking players concerned only with attacking duties, and the six players behind them sitting to defend.
There are several cases for England playing a 4-2-3-1. Many of their attacking players would seem better suited to the formation. Of Raheem Sterling, Adam Lallana, Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain, and James Milner, only Sterling, with his pace and attacking instinct, is a natural playing high and wide in a 4-3-3. While Danny Welbeck clearly sees himself as a striker – and has many of the qualities which tend to make for a useful lone forward – when he is used as a wide player for both England and Manchester United, it is primarily for his ball-winning capabilities, which require him playing in a deeper role. And if Wayne Rooney is not playing up top or centrally behind a striker, he too seems more of a 4-2-3-1 player, happier playmaking and running from a deeper position than he is stretching the play out wide.
At the same time, England’s lack of quality in the central midfield positions is only exacerbated by playing a 4-2-3-1. Together, Steven Gerrard and Jordan Henderson possessed neither the ability nor the athleticism to excel in a demanding role. Perhaps Jack Wilshere could have offered more alongside Henderson – a better combination of tactical nous and running – but England didn’t have many options for the two deeper midfield positions, with Frank Lampard, like Gerrard, having made his career essentially as an attacking player and now old and slow; with James Milner lacking defensive astuteness; and with Ross Barkley excelling for Everton last season playing in an advanced role in a 4-2-3-1, largely free of defensive work, and where misplaced passes are of less consequence. A triangle, with Gerrard sitting deep as he did last season for Liverpool, or a staggered midfield three, even of Wilshere, Henderson and Barkley, would have afforded England more flexibility and more solidity in the centre of the pitch. As Lineker pointed out, the 4-2-3-1 at least functioned more effectively against Italy, where Sterling occupied the central position behind Daniel Sturridge instead of Rooney: whether by trait or inclination, Sterling proved more capable of interlinking with and supporting the two deeper midfielders and connecting England’s play.
The focus on Wayne Rooney in the build up to and during the World Cup was based less on an unhealthy ‘obsession’ or ‘fixation’, as Roy Hodgson and Frank Lampard in turn claimed, but on a foundation of genuine and rational concern. Rooney has failed to impress at an international tournament since 2004; and there is a sense that he doesn’t have an obvious place in the current England setup. This is against an implicit background which has seen England waste a decade of international football trying to shoehorn supposed superstars – Gerrard and Lampard – into first elevens that repeatedly would not function. At club level, Rooney has been marginalised over the last two seasons by Robin van Persie, a better target-man owing to his ability to hold the ball and bring others into play with his back to goal, and a better finisher. For England, Daniel Sturridge headed to Brazil on the back of an excellent season for Liverpool, confident and with his pace a key asset. Rooney did not warrant a striking role ahead of Sturridge; England had better options than an unwilling Rooney out wide; and playing behind the striker, again, Rooney offered too little support to the midfielders behind him. As things stand, he may be England’s most capable all-round footballer, and the second or third best option for a variety of positions, but England ought to try building a team in which Rooney is only an incidental part.
The average age of the England squad was 26.1 years old. In relation to other World Cup squads, Argentina’s was the oldest, with an average age of 28.5, followed by Portugal’s at 28.2, and Uruguay, Greece and Honduras’s each at 28.1. Ghana’s average age of 24.9 was the youngest in the competition, followed by Nigeria (25.3), Belgium (25.5), Switzerland (25.6), and South Korea (25.7). In Group D, aside from Uruguay’s 28.1, the average age of Italy’s squad was 27.4, with CostaRica’s coming in at 27.1. England’s squad, then, was the youngest in their group and towards the younger end of the spectrum in the World Cup: their squad was the ninth youngest overall of the thirty-two competing nations, just older than Germany’s and the Netherlands’, just younger than Algeria’s and Cameroon’s. On the pitch, the gap narrowed: England’s first eleven against Italy and Uruguay had an average age of 26.9 versus average ages of 27.7 and 27.1 respectively; while against Costa Rica, England’s revamped eleven had an average age of 25.4, against Costa Rica’s average age of 26.2 (it is worth pointing out that Costa Rica played largely the same side against England as they had played against Italy and Uruguay, making only two changes, which reduced the average age of their eleven marginally from 26.4).
So England’s squad and its first eleven was young but not exceptionally so. The idea that a young squad will benefit and eventually flourish from this World Cup experience only holds true, of course, provided the same players continue to be picked and provided that they continue to improve and show that they are talented enough for the top level. Raheem Sterling stood out against Italy playing centrally, and would seem to offer the most potential as well as the most possibilities for England even if his immediate future is as a right-sided attacker. Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain impressed in the warm-up game against Ecuador before injury limited his involvement in the tournament, and he provides strength and dribbling ability through the midfield. Daniel Sturridge is an accomplished striker, a good finisher with quick and intelligent movement, and still only twenty-four years old. Danny Welbeck emerges from the World Cup with his reputation surely enhanced after linking well with Sterling and Sturridge against Italy, but his productivity will continue to be questioned as long as he plays away from his preferred position. Ross Barkley and Luke Shaw had strong seasons for their clubs, and will look to build on these for club and country. Adam Lallana is twenty-six, and suggests a later-bloomer, although he has been a mainstay of the Southampton side since turning twenty. While Shaw is set for a big-money move to Manchester United based on solid performances and perceived potential, Lallana had an excellent season for Southampton last year, but may move to Liverpool primarily to afford them with seamless options rather than to improve their starting team.
Of greater concern is England’s defence. Apart from Shaw, there are hopes that Jon Flanagan will continue to prosper for Liverpool and establish himself as a viable option at full-back. Everton’s John Stones was the other defender on World Cup standby; Kieran Gibbs and Steven Caulker are both struggling for a proper opportunity at international level; but of those with some international experience, neither Phil Jones nor Chris Smalling appear sensible long-term prospects, and clearly aren’t being routinely picked based on their decidedly meagre talents. With Phil Jagielka and Gary Cahill a mediocre centre-back pairing, England may struggle over the next few years for a strong and settled defence.
In addition to insightful tactical analysis, Lineker offered an interesting observation regarding a lack of leadership in the England team. This didn’t amount to an assertion that there are too few talkers in the side; instead, Lineker suggested England lack the footballing brains required to ‘spot problems on the pitch’. Singling out Gerrard – who ‘has always been an individual in many ways. He’s not really a player that can organise or spot problems’ – Lineker was clear that the England squad as a collective is without players who can identify issues and implement changes amid the flow and thrust of a game. It is tempting to think that Roy Hodgson too, by virtue of age and ability, is not the man to lead and nurture a group of young players towards a bright future.
Hodgson is a peculiarity in so far as he is routinely described as ‘likeable’ despite being cantankerous and banal whenever he appears in front of the press. He admitted that he encouraged Gerrard to address the squad prior to the second group game against Uruguay, accepting that Gerrard is ‘very good at saying in two or three sentences what takes me 10 minutes to talk through’. Gerrard’s pronouncing was, by his own confession, intended to strike fear into the other players, forcing them to ‘realise it could be a terrible, long, frustrating summer if we don’t get it right on Thursday’. Whether Gerrard’s words were wise, whether he possesses the stature and the intelligence to fulfil the role to which Hodgson appointed him, even more bizarre was Hodgson’s palpable pleasure after the 0-0 draw against Costa Rica, upon which he exclaimed ‘I’m pleased to have given the fans something to cheer’. It is marked that Cesare Prandelli, ten years younger than Hodgson and with as many selection difficulties – inheriting in 2010 a squad from which Fabio Cannavaro, Gianluca Zambrotta, and Gennaro Gattuso had just retired, which was in the process of saying long goodbyes to Alessandro del Piero and Francesco Totti, and with Andrea Pirlo towards the latter stages of his career – immediately tendered his resignation upon Italy’s failure to qualify from the group.
Elsewhere the trite and troubling assertion that too many foreigners are to blame emerged via Gerrard and Paul Scholes (a more independent and thoughtful pundit than there was any justification to expect; though it must be remembered that on the football pitch, memory of Scholes’s violent lunges at opponents make Luis Suarez appear, by way of comparison, a veritable saint). It is worth asking whether we really desire a situation whereby English players, already possessing such economic and infrastructural advantages over so many other youngsters, are afforded positive discrimination to ensure for them a place in the Premier League. While it seems virtuous to encourage Premier League managers to give opportunities to their young players, to enforce that opportunities must be given to Englishmen seems to accept a fundamental financial problem within the game – which English clubs and English players have impelled and exacerbated much more than most – or to admit that English youngsters are lacking in talent and work ethic.
If the latter is the case, then the standard of football coaching at all levels in England must again come under scrutiny. Sitting alongside Shearer and Lineker as they gave their final thoughts on England’s campaign, Chris Waddle afforded precisely this scrutiny. Waddle was, incidentally, along with Lineker and John Barnes, one of the figures who instigated the change of formation, from a 4-4-2 to a 5-3-2, which propelled England to the semi-finals of Italia 90 – a process recounted in Pete Davies’ All Played Out. While coaching problems entwine with broader cultural problems within the English game – which result in the refusal by English players to consider their options abroad – it may be wondered whether, instead of fewer foreign players, more foreign coaches could usefully invigorate youth coaching and football throughout the lower tiers.
culturedallroundman 