Premier League 2014-15 Preview

Arsenal

Arsenal led the Premier League for the majority of last season, but fell away towards the latter stages and finished seven points behind champions Manchester City. Mesut Ozil’s signing last summer served as a statement of intent which – as much as Ozil’s capabilities on the pitch – seemed to spur the rest of the squad to significantly improve upon past performances. Aaron Ramsey in particular was arguably the league’s best player until suffering an injury last Boxing Day; and his form in the pre-season suggests he will continue to be central to Arsenal’s title hopes this time round.

While much of the focus last season centred upon Arsenal’s lack of firepower, the signing of Alexis Sanchez from Barcelona for £35 million seems to have sated many fans’ desires. Sanchez offers Arsenal options: he can play as a wide attacker, off a central striker, or utilising his pace at the head of the attack. He will play either alongside or instead of Olivier Giroud; and with Yaya Sanogo continuing to progress, Joel Campbell an option for the first time on the back of a promising World Cup, and Theo Walcott and Lukas Podolski too, Arsenal seem set in the attacking positions.

Yet they still appear lacking defensively. While they have replaced Bacary Sagna and Thomas Vermaelen with Mathieu Debuchy and Luke Chambers, and possess a solid first-choice back four, they have a squad which contains only three centre-backs and one right-back, having allowed Carl Jenkinson to depart on loan. A strong defensive midfielder may add the most to Arsene Wenger’s first eleven – but there he seems content with Mikel Arteta and Mathieu Flamini, while surely recognising that reinforcements further back are a must for the sake of a competitive season.

Last Season: 4th – Predicted Finish: 2nd

Potential XI: (4-2-3-1) Szczesny, Debuchy, Gibbs, Mertesacker, Koscielny, Arteta, Wilshere, Cazorla, Ramsey, Sanchez, Giroud

Aston Villa

Labouring under an owner in Randy Lerner who – after investing considerably in the early years of his ownership – baulked a couple of seasons ago at the costs involved in Premier League football, Aston Villa have again underwhelmed in the transfer market. While Lerner struggles to find a buyer for the club, Aly Cissokho should prove a solid purchase for the left-back position, but the signings of an aged Joe Cole, Kieran Richardson, and Philippe Senderos are hardly inspiring. Once promising youngsters Marc Albrighton and Nathan Delfouneso have been let go; while Nicklas Helenius, Antonio Luna, and Yacouba Sylla have departed on loan. Goalscorer Christian Benteke will remain out of action with his achilles injury until October.

Roy Keane has been appointed as manager Paul Lambert’s assistant, and whatever the impetus behind that decision, the media will undoubtedly build it into a point of contention should Villa begin to struggle. The signing of Colombia’s Carlos Sanchez, still in the process of being finalised, will at least provide much needed bite in the middle of the pitch; and as well as retaining Ron Vlaar after an impressive World Cup, Lambert has begun the process of reintegrating Charles N’Zogbia, Darrent Bent, and Alan Hutton into worthwhile members of the first-team squad.

Last Season: 15th – Predicted Finish: 11th

Potential XI: (4-3-3) Guzan, Hutton, Cissokho, Vlaar, Okore, Westwood, Sanchez, Delph, N’Zogbia, Weimann, Benteke

Burnley

Sean Dyche will be relying predominantly on last season’s promotion-winning players for Burnley’s survival, as the club have spent conservatively this summer, spending just a few million pounds on the attacking players Lukas Jutkiewicz, Michael Kightly, and Marvin Sordell – each proven only in the Championship – and bringing in Matt Gilks, Matt Taylor, and Steven Reid on free transfers. Stephen Ward has completed his signing from Wolves for an undisclosed fee, just ahead of the season opener at home to Chelsea.

Burnley look set to retain the 4-4-2 formation and the compact, passing, high-pressing game which brought them last season’s success. They will hope for Danny Ings to maintain good goalscoring form; but there will be concerns regarding the overall strength of the squad, and at the potential for being overrun in the centre of midfield.

Last Season: 2nd (Championship, Promoted) – Predicted Finish: 20th

Potential XI: (4-4-2) Heaton, Trippier, Mee, Shackell, Duff, Marney, Jones, Arfield, Kightly, Ings, Jutkiewicz

Chelsea

Having convinced sufficient people that Chelsea weren’t in a position to compete last season, Jose Mourinho has been obliged to praise his squad in the lead up to this campaign. Chelsea have completed the signings of Diego Costa, Cesc Fabregas, and Filipe Luis, while Didier Drogba returns for a second spell with the club. The cost of those transfers has been significantly offset by the sales of Romelu Lukaku and David Luiz. Meanwhile Chelsea continue to hoard youngsters who they can loan out and sell on in a year or two, their values having risen by virtue of playing time or merely by association.

All the same, Chelsea find themselves with an impressive and fairly concise squad. Lacking natural wide players, Luis and Cesar Azpilicueta will start as the side’s full-backs, with Branislav Ivanovic the first port of call for defensive cover. Kurt Zouma – a £12 million signing from Saint-Etienne in January – will provide further reinforcement at centre-back, while the nineteen-year-old Dutchman Nathan Ake may prove a versatile part of the first-team picture . In the attack, Fabregas will likely slot in behind Costa in a 4-2-3-1 for the big games; but he may play a deeper role against lesser opposition, with Drogba, Fernando Torres, Eden Hazard, Andre Schurrle, Oscar, and William to satiate. Thibaut Courtois returns from Atletico Madrid to challenge Petr Cech for the goalkeeper’s jersey – despite their wealth, the only one which Chelsea possess.

Last Season: 3rd – Predicted Finish: 3rd

Potential XI: (4-2-3-1) Cech, Azpilicueta, Luis, Cahill, Terry, Matic, Ramires, Hazard, Fabregas, Schurrle, Costa

Crystal Palace

After eleven games last season, Crystal Palace had four points and were lying at the bottom of the Premier League;  by the end of the season, they had forty-five points, and finished eleventh. The turnabout orchestrated by Tony Pulis showed a capacity which often went unrecognised during his seven-year spell at Stoke, and made him one of the manager’s of the year. So his sudden departure with days to go before the beginning of this campaign throws Palace’s preparations into disarray, and means instead of building upon last year, the focus will again be on scrapping against relegation.

Whatever claims may be made regarding ulterior motives and areas of responsibility, it is hard to argue that – after such a strong close to last season – Palace’s transfer activity hasn’t been insufficient. Just £2.4 million has been spent, with Martin Kelly from Liverpool and Frazier Campbell from Cardiff arriving for fees, and Brede Hangeland and Chris Kettings coming in on free transfers. Still, the squad have last season’s experience to draw from, and Joe Ledley, Dwight Gayle, and Marouane Chamakh will hope to flourish in their second seasons with the club.

Last Season: 11th – Predicted Finish: 18th

Potential XI: (4-2-3-1) Speroni, Mariappa, Ward, Dann, Hangeland, Jedinak, Ledley, Puncheon, Chamakh, Bolasie, Gayle

Everton

Owing to the idiosyncrasies of the modern loan market, Everton have spent considerably this summer and shown significant intent with their purchases – yet their squad isn’t vastly different from the one which finished fifth last time round. Romelu Lukaku has returned to the club after last season’s loan spell for a fee of £28 million, and has the tools to become one of the game’s best all-round centre forwards: quick and powerful, but with the awareness to bring others into play. Gareth Barry has also joined the club on a permanent deal from Manchester City. Christian Atsu, on a season’s loan from Chelsea, will fill the role taken last year by Gerard Deulofeu, providing pace and dribbling and an option from the bench.

Muhamed Besic has been bought after a solid showing in the group stages of the World Cup for Bosnia and Herzegovina. He will provide competition in the centre of midfield for James McCarthy and Barry, while freeing up Everton’s attacking midfielders. More, Roberto Martinez will welcome back Bryan Oviedo and Arouna Kone after both suffered long-term injuries last year. A repeat of last season’s placing would be an achievement, but Roberto Martinez has developed a coherent system, settled yet versatile, and a challenge on the top four is within the squad’s potential.

Last Season: 5th – Predicted Finish: 5th

Potential XI: (4-2-3-1) Howard, Coleman, Baines, Jagielka, Distin, McCarthy, Barry, Mirallas, Barkley, Pienaar, Lukaku

Hull City

Hull’s league form fell away towards the tail end of last season, with survival secured and an FA Cup final on the horizon. They still have a playoff to navigate before entering this season’s Europa League proper; and their preparations for the year ahead may have been compromised by Shane Long’s surprise £12 million move to Southampton. Long developed a hardworking partnership with Nika Jelavic in Hull’s attack after both signed for the club in January, and while the offer from Southampton was much too good to refuse, it leaves Hull looking for replacement before the close of the transfer window.

Elsewhere Hull look done and dusted, having signed the midfielders Jake Livermore, Robert Snodgrass, and Tom Ince, and the young defenders Andrew Robertson and Harry Maguire. Steve Bruce has utilised his 3-5-2 extensively during the pre-season, and it remains to be seen whether he will revert to a 4-4-2 or 4-4-1-1 for Hull’s first run of league games.

Last Season: 16th – Predicted Finish: 17th

Potential XI: (3-5-2) McGregor, Chester, Davies, Bruce, Elmohamady, Livermore, Huddlestone, Snodgrass, Robertson, Aluko, Jelavic

Leicester City

Like Burnley, who they beat to the Championship title, Leicester have been prudent in the transfer market, paying money only for the twenty-eight-year-old Argentine Leonardo Ulloa, an £8 million purchase after impressing with fourteen league goals last season for Brighton & Hove Albion. Otherwise, Leicester have relied on frees, bringing in Marc Albrighton, Matthew Upson, and goalkeeper Ben Hamer.

Nigel Pearson is likely to stick with the 4-4-2 formation which saw Leicester break a hundred points in achieving their promotion to the Premier League. Dave Nugent has been the standout of the pre-season. They may still be on the lookout for an additional full back and central midfielder for the battle against relegation which awaits.

Last Season: 1st (Championship, Promoted) – Predicted Finish: 16th

Potential XI: (4-4-2) Schmeichel, De Laet, Konchesky, Moore, Morgan, Mahrez, Drinkwater, James, Albrighton, Nugent, Ulloa

Liverpool

Liverpool haven’t looked to replace Luis Suarez, but instead have added significant depth to the remainder of last season’s title challenging squad. While the quantity of their purchases and the money they have spent has drawn comparisons with Tottenham after last summer’s sale of Gareth Bale, Brendan Rodgers has focused more closely on players who will fit into an already established pattern of play – and on Premiership experience in the Southampton trio of Adam Lallana, Dejan Lovren, and Rickie Lambert. While Lallana and Lovren seem significantly overpriced in a market that is increasingly distended and difficult to judge, Lallana provides close control and steady creativity in the final third, while Lovren may stake a readier claim to a starting berth in the centre of Liverpool’s defence.

If Lallana and Lambert suggest the possibilities for a slightly slower tempo, Lazar Markovic is blessed with pace and is Liverpool’s most exciting summer signing. Emre Can may be their most astute, shoring up the centre of the pitch. Long-term loanee Javi Manquillo is an unknown quantity, at twenty having played only a handful of games for Atletico Madrid; but he seems set to compete for a first team place at right-back. Divock Origi is a signing for the future, and will spend 2014-15 back at Lille. The question, of course, is whether Liverpool can maintain something approaching the same attacking dynamism and goalscoring capacity now that Suarez has departed – all in all, a loss for English football, as flawed characters litter the game, but few possess his vigour, determination, and talent.

Last Season: 2nd – Predicted Finish: 4th

Potential XI: (4-3-3) Mignolet, Manquillo, Johnson, Lovren, Skrtel, Gerrard, Can, Henderson, Coutinho, Sterling, Sturridge

Manchester City

After falling foul of financial fair play, City have been limited in the transfer market this summer, and have focused on defensive acquisitions. Most of their £49 million budget has gone on the centre-back Eliaquim Mangela, a £32 million signing from Porto. Fernando arrives from the same club, and will sit in the midfield, allowing Yaya Toure and Fernandinho to push on into the attacking areas. Willy Cabellero will compete with Joe Hart in goal. Bacary Sagna has signed on a free transfer from Arsenal. Midfielder Bruno Zucolini – twenty-one years old, and signing for around £1.5 million from Racing Club in Argentina –  has worked himself into the picture with a string of good performances in pre-season. City will also have Frank Lampard available on loan, until he returns to partner club New York City next January.

As well as releasing Gareth Barry and Joleon Lescott, City have made back £23 million via the sales of Javi Garcia and Jack Rodwell. With Alvaro Negredo missing the start of the season and Sergio Aguero suffering persistent injury problems, Stevan Jovetic should see more game time this season. Despite the more celebrated signings of their title competitors, City will remain the team to beat.

Last Season: 1st – Predicted Finish: 1st

Potential XI: (4-2-2-2) Cabellero, Sagna, Kolarov, Kompany, Mangela, Fernando, Toure, Silva, Nasri, Jovetic, Aguero

Manchester United

Undoubtedly one of the game’s greatest as well as most influential and intriguing managers, Louis van Gaal poses a problem for those of us predisposed to dislike Manchester United. The renewed optimism in and around and at sizeable distances from Old Trafford is understandable, especially after the Netherlands’ showing at the World Cup; yet Van Gaal has his own problems to face.

The 3-4-1-2 he has utilised in pre-season aims to get the most out of Juan Mata, Wayne Rooney, and Robin van Persie – allowing each to occupy their preferred central attacking positions. But it asks questions of the side’s defenders, with only three first-team centre-backs – in Jonny Evans, Chris Smalling, and Phil Jones – in the squad after the departures of Rio Ferdinand and Nemanja Vidic; Rafael suffering constant injury niggles; and Luke Shaw – signed for £27 million based on potential talent and potential longevity rather than for any outstanding ability which he possesses at present – not ideally suited for a wing-back role.  Ashley Young and Antonio Valencia can fit into the system down the right, but it still leaves a lopsided squad, with Danny Welbeck sure to receive games, but less space for Shinji Kagawa, Nani, Javier Hernandez, and Adnan Januzaj. To really challenge, Manchester United will need to spend on at least one centre-back; and they may require another central midfielder to partner Ander Herrera, lest Marouane Fellaini ever find his way onto the pitch.

Last Season: 7th – Predicted Finish: 7th

Potential XI: (3-4-1-2) De Gea, Smalling, Evans, Jones, Rafael, Herrera, Carrick, Shaw, Mata, Rooney, Van Persie

Newcastle

While the club have received praise for the apparent haste and extent of their summer incomings, the truth is that Newcastle have again – rather than building a competitive team – simply replaced what has been lost, and at a crucial moment after the horrid close to last season, which saw an impotent attack allied to a porous defence and an increasingly disgruntled fanbase. So Siem de Jong has replaced Yohan Cabaye; Daryl Janmaat has replaced Mathieu Debuchy; and Emmanuel Riviere and Facundo Ferrerya have replaced Loic Remy and Shola Ameobi. Jack Colback comes in to take a spot alternately occupied by Jonas Gutierrez – frozen out of the squad on his return from a loan spell at Norwich – and Dan Gosling. Remy Cabella is an exciting addition; but woeful mismanagement of Hatem Ben Arfa leaves Cabella the side’s only genuine wide attacker, and it is not improbable that Cabella will go the same way as his compatriot under a manager and a coaching setup which has proven entirely incapable of implementing any attacking style of play. Youngsters too do not develop here, which does not bode well for the future of Ayoze Perez, who may be a peripheral figure anyway owing to his age and lack of experience.

Meanwhile in the defence Steven Taylor continues to regress and Fabricio Coloccini – after gallant service – looks increasingly past his best and shorn of interest. Davide Santon has stagnated; and Mapou Yanga-Mbiwa has been shunted out of position and thus appears shaky when asked to fill in. When they are tasked with finding players, Newcastle’s scouts have invariably found some good talents for low prices – but the club is in a rut under a thoroughly inadequate and unpleasant manager. They should finish mid-table again, but could struggle without a proven goalscorer to tide over a lack of substance elsewhere.

Last season: 10th – Predicted Finish: 10th

Potential XI: (4-4-1-1) Krul, Janmaat, Haidara, Williamson, Coloccini, Sissoko, Tiote, Colback, Cabella, De Jong, Riviere

Queens Park Rangers

An unwelcome return to the Premier League for Harry Redknapp, who apparently would have retired from the game had QPR missed out on promotion last season, which they achieved through the playoffs after finishing only fourth in the Championship. They have had a good summer in the transfer market, signing Steven Caulker and Jordan Mutch who impressed during the last campaign for Cardiff. Caulker will be partnered in what looks set to be a three-man defence by Rio Ferdinand, arriving from Manchester United on a free; while the signing of Chile’s Mauricio Isla on loan is a coup even after his indifferent spell at Juventus.

Isla is ideally suited to the 3-5-2 system with wing-backs which Redknapp has used in the pre-season. Armand Traore can fulfill the same sort of role down QPR’s left. In the attack, with various proposed moves for Loic Remy falling through seemingly thanks to his exorbitant wage demands, QPR have been left with options in Remy and Mutch, Charlie Austin, Bobby Zamora, Junior Hoilett, and Adel Taraabt. If Remy does find a move before the close of the window, QPR will need to find a striking replacement. Otherwise, they look weakest in the centre of midfield, while Caulker may have to cover for a lack of pace elsewhere in the defence.

Last Season: 4th (Championship, Promoted) – Predicted Finish: 9th

Potential XI: (3-4-1-2) Green, Caulker, Ferdinand, Onuoha, Isla, Barton, Faurlin, Traore, Mutch, Austin, Remy

Southampton

New manager Ronald Koeman has found himself thrown into the midst of a side which has been dismantled over the summer. Luke Shaw, Adam Lallana, Dejan Lovren, Calum Chambers, and Rickie Lambert – essential first team players last season under Mauricio Pochettino – have all left the club. Morgan Schneiderlin and Jay Rodriguez seemed well on their way towards moves to Tottenham, only for Southampton to end negotiations apparently at a late stage, and owing to the fans’ growing discontent.

Provided he does not leave before the end of the window, Koeman will happily reintegrate Schneiderlin into his team – and he will have to play to the best of his abilities if Southampton aren’t to fall into a relegation struggle. They have just about replaced the players lost, but have largely gambled on players untested at the same level. Ryan Bertrand – brought in on loan with an expensive £10 million option to make the deal permanent – is an uninspiring replacement for Shaw, after a poor spell on loan last term for Aston Villa. Florin Gardos, a 6’4” centre-back, has arrived from Steaua Bucharest. Saphir Taider has come in on loan from Inter Milan, after a bright showing for Algeria in the World Cup. Fraser Foster, signed for £10 million from Celtic, has surely been bought to replace Artur Boruc as Southampton’s first-choice goalkeeper.

While these seem competent enough defensive reinforcements, Southampton’s difficulties may arise at the other end of the pitch. Shane Long’s £12 million fee seems excessive for a player who is undoubtedly a nuisance, with pace, work-rate, and an inclination to foul his opponents – but for all his qualities he doesn’t score goals. For creativity, Southampton will be largely reliant on Dusan Tadic, a talented left-footer with exceptional passing and dribbling ability. Tadic, however, lacks stamina and a turn of pace; and like Graziano Pelle, also signed from the Netherlands, will face a challenge adapting to the league.

Last Season: 7th – Predicted Finish: 14th

Potential XI: (4-2-3-1) Foster, Clyne, Fonte, Gardos, Bertrand, Schneiderlin, Wanyama, Tadic, Davis, Long, Pelle

Stoke City

Bojan Krkic’s move from Barcelona – after a series of extended loans and temporary departures over the past several years – to Stoke is one of the most interesting transfers of the summer. It remains to be seen whether he will feature as a striker, or predominantly from the left side of a front three. Mame Biram Diouf has also signed from Hannover, to add a more direct and physical presence to what is now a roundly talented front line. Stoke have been locked in negotiations with Liverpool for Oussama Assaidi, who did well for them on loan last term – but the loan signing of Victor Moses from Chelsea, completed today, may put an end to that endeavour.

Further back, Steve Sidwell and Phil Bardsley have joined on frees to add experience, if not ability; and the centre back Dionatan Teixeira has arrived from Slovakian football. All in all, Stoke under Mark Hughes seem well placed to repeat last season’s strong, upper mid-table showing.

Last Season: 9th – Predicted Finish: 8th

Potential XI: (4-3-3) Begovic, Bardsley, Pieters, Shawcross, Wilson, Whelan, N’Zonzi, Ireland, Arnautovic, Bojan, Diouf

Sunderland

For a club with a large and devoted fanbase – consistently drawing over 40,000 supporters to their home games – Sunderland plod on from season to season, intermittently facing some sort of crisis in form or personnel, failing to assert a long-term strategy or emboldened style of play. Losing Jack Colback and moving on Ignacio Scocco, Phil Bardsley, and Craig Gardner, Sunderland have signed Jack Rodwell and Will Buckley, and full-back Patrick van Aanholt; while Costel Pantilimon, Billy Jones, and Jordi Gomez have arrived on free transfers. Santiago Vergini comes in on loan from Estudiantes.

Gus Poyet is likely to retain last season’s hardworking, counter-attacking 4-5-1, with the wide players pushing on, and the team headed by Connor Wickham – who looks set to remain at the club despite a contract dispute and interest from West Ham – or Steven Fletcher. Rodwell will hopefully add some class and composure through the middle of the pitch.

Last Season: 14th – Predicted Finish: 15th

Potential XI: (4-5-1-) Mannone, Vergini, Van Aanholt, Brown, O’Shea, Larsson, Cattermole, Rodwell, Johnson, Wickham, Fletcher

Swansea

Swansea have made some promising signings over the summer. Gylfi Sigurdsson returns for a second spell with the club, a £10 million signing from Tottenham. He will slot into the attack alongside the Ecuadorian winger Jefferson Montero, and Bafetimbi Gomes, finally making the move to English football after year’s of speculation linking him with a mass of clubs. Swansea have retained Wilfried Bony, and with the addition of Marvin Emnes too, can boast a quick and determined attack.

With Ben Davies and Michel Vorm departing for Tottenham, Lukasz Fabianski has arrived on a free to take the goalkeeper’s jersey. Swansea will look to retain the passing approach developed across recent seasons, but the additional pace on the flanks and the presence of Gomis gives them the possibility of playing more directly as and when the situation demands. Doubts remain over the slightly aggravating Gary Monk’s suitability as manager.

Last Season: 12th – Predicted Finish: 12th

Potential XI: (4-3-3) Vorm, Rangel, Taylor, Amat, Williams, Britton, Ki, Sigurdsson, Routledge, Montero, Bony

Tottenham

A relatively quiet summer for Tottenham has seen the arrival of four players: young left-back Ben Davies and goalkeeper Michel Vorm from Swansea; the twenty-year-old English centre-back Eric Dier from Sporting Lisbon; and DeAndre Yedlin from Seattle Sounders – though the promising twenty-one-year-old right-back, who impressed with storming runs down the flank for the United States during the World Cup, will remain with Seattle for the time being.

Mauricio Pochettino will focus on moulding the players signed last summer into a coherent team. Tottenham certainly have the squad to excel in his preferred 4-2-3-1 system, and players capable of passing the ball incisively and quickly building attacks. As well as the emergence of Dier in the defence and Nabil Bentaleb in the centre of midfield, this season should see improved performances from Christian Eriksen and Erik Lamela.

Last Season: 6th – Predicted Finish: 6th

Potential XI: (4-2-3-1) Loris, Walker, Rose, Kaboul, Vertonghen, Capoue, Holtby, Lennon, Eriksen, Lamela, Adebayor

West Brom

The appointment of Alan Irvine as West Brom’s new manager, and only on a twelve-month rolling contract, has underwhelmed. West Brom have been busy in the transfer market. The striker Brown Ideye, from Dynamo Kiev, is the club’s most expensive purchase at £10 million – but he is also the club’s only attacking signing. Otherwise, a host of defenders have arrived, including the attacking Costa Rican right-back Cristian Gamboa; the experienced left-back Sebastien Pocognoli; another left-back in Australia’s Jason Davidson; Joleon Lescott and Chris Baird, who have signed on frees transfers; and Andre Wisdom, from Liverpool on loan. Craig Gardner also arrives on a free from Sunderland to add depth in the midfield.

Gamboa may be utilised higher up the pitch, but West Brom need additional pace and quality in the attack if it isn’t going to prove a very long season. As things stand, whatever qualites Victor Anichebe presents, he is not a goalscorer, so the side will be heavily reliant on Ideye.

Last Season: 17th – Predicted Finish: 19th

Potential XI: (4-5-1) Foster, Gamboa, Pocognoli, Olssen, Lescott, Mulumbu, Yacob, Sessegnon, Dorrans, Brunt, Ideye

West Ham

Still under Sam ‘Fat Sam’ Allardyce, West Ham have been unusually outgoing with their summer incomings. Enner Valencia arrives for £12 million after three goals for Ecuador in the World Cup. In Andy Carroll’s ongoing absence owing to a litany of injury troubles, Diafra Sakho has also signed for around £3.5 million from Metz, to provide West Ham with a new-look strikeforce going into the season. In the long term, though Valencia is blessed with a prodigious leap, it will be interesting to see whether Allardyce relies on him to lead the attack – or instead plays him from wide or partners him with a taller striker in Sakho or Carlton Cole.

The defensive midfielder Cheikhou Kouyate comes in for £7 million from Anderlecht. And West Ham have also signed the left-back Aaron Cresswell from Ipswich, the young midfielder Diego Poyet from Charlton, and forward Mauro Zarate – once of Birmingham, and looking to revitalise his career – on a free transfer. Carl Jenkinson arrives from Arsenal on a season-long loan.

Last Season: 13th – Predicted Finish: 13th

Potential XI: (4-2-3-1) Adrian, Jenkinson, Cresswell, Collins, Reid, Kouyate, Noble, Downing, Nolan, Diame, Valencia

A Sporting and Cultural History of the 2014 World Cup

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In five parts and totalling about 15,000 words – analysing the final of the tournament, viewing all thirty-two competing nations, and offering a wider perspective comprising fashion, politics, music, technology, and football’s myriad engagements with popular culture – my site may provide what is, at this point in time, the definitive history of the 2014 FIFA World Cup.

The image above affords a perverse but pretty way of accessing the five articles I’ve posted since the event in Brazil came to a close three weeks ago. They are, in turn, Germany 1-0 Argentina: An Analysis of the 2014 World Cup Final; What’s Wrong with Brazil? Evaluating the World Cup: Groups A-D; Evaluating the World Cup: Groups E-H; Fashioning a World Cup Final: How the BBC Dressed; and The World Cup in Wider Culture. Simply click upon the image or image-section which most intrigues or excites.

The World Cup in Wider Culture

While on the field, the 2014 World Cup saw the rise of new superstars, the decline of footballing philosophies, the interplay between varying formations, and appeared to demonstrate the narrowing of traditional power gaps in the international game – in the knockout stages, from the round of sixteen through to the final, only three of fifteen matches were won by a margin greater than one goal – this piece extends beyond the confines of the pitch and beyond the immediacies of the sport. It looks at the wider cultural aspects which informed or which emerged from the World Cup.

In turn, it considers how Brazilian society functioned towards and about the tournament, and the ways in which the mass media depicted Brazilians; views the psychology and sociology of individualism as it is increasingly made manifest throughout the game; analyses the rise and spurt of soccer in the United States, and Twitter’s role in soccer’s recent prominence; plays upon the nature and extension of World Cup chants; and contemplates the innovative and encompassing uses of technology which influenced and drew upon the month-long affair.

Brazilians: Competent Organisers, Not So Crazy About Football

The buildup to the 2014 World Cup was dominated in the Anglophone media by apprehension over Brazil’s capability to host the event. The issue at the forefront of the story was the building of Brazil’s World Cup stadiums. Countless articles suggested that stadiums would not be finished in time for the beginning of the World Cup. Posited problems covered everything from incomplete roofing, exposed wiring and concrete, loose scaffolding, and unstable staircases, to blocked exits, no internet, and insufficient catering and transportation. As NBC put it, ‘Brazil will welcome the players and fans to unfinished airports, drive them past uncompleted transport systems, through streets that have been clogged with rioters protesting the cost of the tournament and into stadiums that have cost lives to build and haven’t all been finished.’

Even FIFA delegates described the preparations as ‘hell’ and the ‘worst ever’ – allegations which have already been made regarding Rio’s progress towards the Summer Olympics in 2016. Across the couple of weeks immediately preceding the start of the World Cup, it was repeatedly asserted that Brazil was not yet ready to hold the tournament, with particular worry over the stadiums in Sao Paulo and Manaus. Manaus was the target of additional mockery when, just days before the venue was to host its opening match between England and Italy, it was claimed that ground staff had been painting the pitch green to hide the fact that it was dry and underfed.

There remain vital concerns over the extent of Brazil’s expenditure on World Cup stadiums – which is thought to have totalled $3.6 billion – and over the simultaneous lack of work completed on local infrastructure projects. Despite spending over €11 billion on infrastructure, half of the projects intended for completion back in 2007, when Brazil was awarded the World Cup, were subsequently scrapped. These included the proposed high-speed rail line between Rio and Sao Paulo; although a small number of projects did find happy conclusions, with a line of the Salvador Metro in Bahia finished just prior to the onset of competition after fourteen years under construction, and taking spectators to the Arena Fonte Nova. More, some of the stadiums are without top-level clubs and will struggle to be utilised beyond the World Cup, bringing into question the long-term legacy of the tournament.

At the same time, the World Cup itself appeared to suffer little from any architectural or infrastructural issues. The stadiums were ultimately all completed in time; few problems were reported with travel between airports or to and from stadiums; and even the pitch in Manaus held up for its four group games. Preparations for major sporting events tend to prove problematic. It must be remembered that the City of Manchester Stadium, built with two temporary stands for the 2002 Commonwealth Games, was still undergoing work in the days before the event’s opening ceremony, and a metro link between the stadium and the city went incomplete. The Athens Summer Olympics in 2004 saw soaring costs and a race to be ready amid numerous delays to construction. While the Olympic venues were completed well within schedule for Beijing 2008, the Games brought considerable controversy over forced relocations: which affected somewhere between the Chinese government’s suggested 6,000 families, and the 1.5 million residents predicted by human rights groups.

In fact, many quarters have acclaimed the organisational achievement on display in Brazil. A survey of foreign journalists suggests an overwhelmingly positive response to the travel provision, airport service, and level of personal security afforded during the World Cup, as well as towards Brazilian culture and nightlife. David Ranc of the Football Research in an Enlarged Europe project has argued that the World Cup in Brazil was better organised than the 2012 London Olympics, citing routinely full stadiums and relatively conservative large-scale security measures. The counter argument has also been made that – despite problems with the provision and construction of stadia and the continuing inequality which is characteristic of Brazilian society – Brazil’s hosting of the World Cup ought to be seen as a testament to the country’s growth, and to the significant improvements made in health and education over the last decade.

Beyond the headlines regarding unfinished or unfurnished stadiums, fears were expressed in bursts that the World Cup would be beset by riots. A wave of protests took place across Brazilian cities in June 2013, with the impetus being fare increases to public transportation, but feeling soon extending to encompass anger over other social issues, over perceived governmental corruption, and at the excessive police response to the protests, which included the use of rubber bullets. The protests became known inside Brazil as the ‘V for Vinegar Movement’, after groups of protesters were allegedly arrested for carrying vinegar, intended as a remedy against the police’s use of tear gas and pepper spray. The height of these protests intertwined with Brazil’s hosting of the 2013 Confederations Cup. With the protest movement and football linked, growing upset over the cost of the World Cup, and a sense of complicity between the Brazilian government and FIFA, belief built that the tournament was liable to see trouble on the streets and around the stadiums.

While there were clashes in Brazil’s major cities as the World Cup got underway – which saw the police again use tear gas on those demonstrating – these soon subsided. With little to report, conjecture arose that an early exit for Brazil would prove the catalyst for violent manifestations of unrest. Given the context, these fears were understandable, and aired by committed and talented journalists, including the BBC’s Tim Vickery. However, vague and concerned premonitions became, in the tabloid presses, scaremongering invoking the potential for widespread rioting and dirty bombs.

So as Brazil’s drubbing at the hands of Germany in the semi-finals was still being digested, speculation proliferated online and across social media as to whether it would provoke the Brazilian people into rioting. By late evening, sensationalised reports of rioting, flag-burning, and mass theft were being published. Such accounts were soon being tempered, however, with the Brazilian police suggesting that some disturbance on Copacabana beach had amounted to little more than fighting between opposing groups of supporters, and reports of theft and gunfire remaining unconfirmed. A number of photos eagerly circulated as evidence of renewed rioting turned out to be deceptive, with the images actually drawn from the Confederations Cup protests a year ago.

The argument persists that the response of the Brazilian police has been marked by aggression, and that their heavy-handed approach limited the capacity of demonstrators during the World Cup. Still, there appears a discrepancy between the notion of Brazilians set upon trouble – and distraught to the point of violence or insensibility upon the loss of a football match – and what actually occurred after their side’s capitulation. Instead of attacking or mourning, Brazilian supporters seemed models of magnanimity following the game against Germany, recognising the flaws of the Brazilian team, and praising the abilities of their competitors. Appreciative of good football rather than narrowly and viciously partisan, the positive atmosphere in Brazil around the game and around the teams of the World Cup remained for the duration of the competition.

A Surfeit of Individualism

Though individuals have found themselves the centres of attention at many previous World Cups – Diego Maradona in Mexico in 1986, for instance, and again for less savoury reasons eight years later at USA 94; while Ronaldo came to dominate the world’s focus in the buildup to the final of France 98, as he suffered a convulsive fit just hours before kickoff  – never before has a tournament been built so thoroughly upon individual players. Many of the top teams seemed structured round one player, whether by design or by necessity.

Brazil and Argentina, the two favourites going into the tournament, were – despite a divergence in experience and subtly differing gameplans – from the start orchestrated around their outstanding attacking players, Neymar and Lionel Messi. Though both players had strong tournaments, finishing with four goals apiece, Brazil floundered dramatically after Neymar suffered an injury in their quarter-final game against Colombia, while – despite leading Argentina to the final with an array of crucial goals and assists – the unduly critical perception shared by many was that Messi had failed to excel. After a lackadaisical close to the season with Barcelona, it was thought that he could go on to consolidate on the international stage his reputation as one of the world’s greatest ever players. He was awarded the Golden Ball, and so officially declared the tournament’s best player; but this decision was broadly derided, by figures including FIFA President Sepp Blatter and by Maradona, who triumphed with Argentina back in 86.

Elsewhere, with their striker Radamel Falcao out of action owing to a knee injury, and despite impressive performances by Cuadrado and their defensive players, James Rodriguez became the figurehead for Colombia and – though Monaco spent €45 million on him a season ago – the breakout star of the World Cup. Alexis Sanchez occupied a similar position for Chile, and was the standout from their side especially as Arturo Vidal struggled for fitness. Arjen Robben was clearly the Netherlands’ exceptional player, the impetus to their attack as Robin van Persie stuttered and Wesley Sneijder indicated a career on a steep decline. Uruguay were capable and committed with Luis Suarez on the pitch, but abject without him. Clint Dempsey for the USA and Tim Cahill for Australia – attacking midfielders or second-strikers for much of their careers – were tasked with leading the line and focusing their sides. And likewise Nigeria and South Korea were largely reliant on their wide attackers, Ahmed Musa and Son Heung-Min respectively.

While the focus on individual players was variously tactical it was also philosophical, and extended beyond the immediate contexts of the sport to reflect a wider sociological impulse. Even where facts on the pitch seemed to refute the reliance upon star men, still nations clung to individuals. Wayne Rooney continued, in the lead up to the tournament, to be regarded England’s best hope for success, and he continues to be considered the squad’s only world class player, quite ignoring a litany of mediocre performances at major tournaments and the emergence of youngsters who would seem to challenge his place in the team. Didier Drogba was restored to the Ivory Coast eleven for their decisive group encounter against Greece, despite looking his age and in spite of Wilfried Bony’s two goals in the two previous matches.

Most egregious, however, was the decision to interrupt the World Cup final itself with an individual awards ceremony for FIFA’s chosen players. Thus – before Germany were able to lift the World Cup – Manuel Neuer and a defeated and deflated Lionel Messi ascended to receive their awards for Golden Glove, as the tournament’s best goalkeeper, and Golden Ball. James Rodriguez, the winner of the Golden Boot with six goals, and Paul Pogba, decreed in association with Hyundai the tournament’s best young player, were not dragged out for the occasion; but postponing the celebrations of the victorious team in order to regale and reify the individual contribution seemed an error indicative beyond football, and especially absurd given that one of the awarded individuals had just lost arguably the most important game of his career.

Twitter and the Rise of Soccer in the United States

The World Cup final between Germany and Argentina was the most-watched football game in the history of American television. 26.5 million viewers tuned in overall to watch the match live on television, with 17.3 million following in English via ABC, while 9.2 million watched in Spanish over on Univision. The figure of 26.5 million compares with the 24.7 million who watched as Spain beat the Netherlands four years ago in 2010; with the 14.5 million who watched the final of the World Cup held in the USA in 1994; and with the average audiences of 15 million obtained by both this year’s NBA Finals and last year’s baseball World Series.

A further 1.8 million people viewed Germany vs. Argentina online using WatchESPN. Adding those online viewers via ABC and Univision, the total number of people on all devices watching the game live came to just over 29 million. And these figures remain restricted to those who watched within the confines of their own homes: the figures do not account for the people who packed America’s bars to watch, or attended viewing parties hosted in clubs, parks and cinemas, and in their potential thousands at local stadiums.

The 2014 World Cup averaged 4.557 million viewers in the US, in contrast to the 3.273 million who watched each match on average in 2010, the 2.321 million from 2006, and the 2.801 million who watched back in 1994. Such numbers do not guarantee that the game’s appeal will continue to grow, or that it will flourish inside America. Viewing figures this time round have been aided by the proximity of US time zones with those in Brazil; while for 2018, ESPN – who have led soccer coverage in the US and dedicated considerable television time to analysing the latest tournament – have lost the World Cup rights to Fox.

Domestically, the average attendance figure for the 2014 season of Major League Soccer so far has been 18,704: a slight increase on the previous season’s average, but still marginally down on the number from 2012, and leaving many stadiums well short of capacity. In fact, despite rising from a low of 13,756 in 2000, since the first season of Major League Soccer in 1996, match-day attendances have hardly boomed: then, a novelty and just two years after the 1994 World Cup, 17,406 people on average attended Major League Soccer games. If the trend is for more and more people in the United States to watch football on television, this does not appear to be translating into behinds upon stadium seats. Perhaps this will change in 2015, on the back of a World Cup which has been so popular – and which has been widely discussed as a turning point for the game in the US – and with new players, including Kaka, David Villa, and Frank Lampard, set to bolster the domestic league. Meanwhile NBC continues to invest time and effort in the English Premier League, having spent £250 million for the rights from 2012; and Fox have acquired the rights to the Bundesliga for five seasons starting next year. Major international football will return to the US in 2016, when it will host the Copa America Centenario: a special edition of the Copa America to celebrate its centenary, which will feature the ten South American teams plus the United States, Mexico, and four others from CONCACAF still to be determined.

The popularity of this summer’s World Cup in the US owes significantly to the rise of Twitter. In 2006, Twitter was just starting out, first being launched publicly that July. By the second quarter of 2010, it had grown to boast 40 million monthly active users. Yet four years on, that number has risen to 255 million. Over 62% of these active Twitter users live in the United States. And throughout the World Cup, Twitter was a prominent force for the spread of US soccer fervour. During the United States’ three group matches, over 15 million tweets were sent relating to the team’s progress. During the round of sixteen game against Belgium, Twitter recorded more than 9 million tweets sent. Major American companies took to Twitter to post images of themselves laying aside work to watch the games. Sites like Mashable came replete with postings which simply highlighted Twitter responses to the US team’s highs and lows.

Rihanna – who has the eighth most-followed Twitter account, with over 36.5 million followers – emerged as an ardent fan of the sport throughout the World Cup’s proceedings, tweeting photographs of herself at the final at the Maracana in Rio, and then with the German players as they celebrated their victory on into the night. Overall, Twitter reported that 672 million tweets were sent pertaining to the World Cup across its one-month duration. 35.6 million tweets were recorded as Germany beat Brazil 7-1; and a record 618,725 tweets were sent per minute as Mario Gotze scored Germany’s decisive, cup-winning goal against Argentina.

The Sacred and the Profane: The Extension of World Cup Chants

The 2014 World Cup saw innovations in the realm of football chants, as they became increasingly elaborate, frequently political, and transcended the sport to become part of the summer’s pop-culture. Spain’s early exit from the tournament – aside from damaging the prospects of national retailers grown accustomed to the team’s success – meant that short shrift was given to ‘Yo soy Español, Español, Español’, the chant which characterised Spain’s triumph in South Africa four years ago. England persisted at moments during their brief stay with the jocularly antagonistic ‘Two World Wars and One World Cup’, sung to the tune of the minstrel song ‘Camptown Races’; and Germany introduced a contemporary political perspective to proceedings when, in their match against the United States, their fans responded to shouts of ‘USA! USA!’ with ‘NSA! NSA!’. Algeria progressed to the round of sixteen with their famous chant ‘One, two, three – viva l’Algiré!’ – recited in English, and an emblem of the Algerian revolution against French rule. Hosts Brazil stuck with ‘Eu sou Brasileiro, com muito orgulho, com muito amor’ – ‘I am Brazilian, with a lot of pride, and a lot of love’.

Brazil were involved in one of the minor controversies of the tournament when their game against Mexico highlighted the Mexican supporters’ use of a contentious chant during opposition goal-kicks. In recent years, Mexicans have taken to shouting ‘puto’ just as an opposition goalkeeper makes contact with the ball. The endeavour to perturb an opposition goalkeeper is not unique, and similar goading occurs throughout football. Yet it has been strongly argued that ‘puto’ is a homophobic insult, more than simply an allegation of cowardice or an indistinct profanity. After Brazil faced Mexico, and at the instigation of the anti-discrimination group Fare, FIFA opened an investigation into both nations, who they ultimately cleared from any wrongdoing. Brazil had apparently retorted in kind to Mexico’s chants. For their part, Mexican supporters responded to this perceived mendacious and unnecessary meddling by subsequently changing the chant from ‘puto’ to ‘Pepsi’ – the leading competitor to Coca-Cola, who were one of the tournament’s main sponsors.

The White Stripes’ ‘Seven Nation Army’ can already claim a rich history upon football’s seating areas and terraces. The basic melody of the song – thought to be derived from Bruckner’s Fifth Symphony – was first appropriated back in 2003 by Club Brugge of Belgium, before being co-opted by AS Roma when they met Brugge in the 2005-06 UEFA Cup. By the summer of 2006 – and still known phonetically among Italian players and supporters as ‘Po-po-po’ – it had become the unofficial theme for the Azzurri, as Italy won the 2006 World Cup. The melody was a prominent facet of the celebrations, led by Francesco Totti, as the Italian squad arrived, triumphant, back in Rome.

Still sung for and most closely associated with the Italian national team, the melody has since extended throughout the world of sport. It was ubiquitous during the 2008 European Championships in Austria and Switzerland; and featured again four years later in Poland and Ukraine. In the United States, ‘Seven Nation Army’ has become a staple of college football and college basketball games, and has been utilised through the NBA and in the NFL, where it is especially favoured by the Baltimore Ravens. Emerging amidst the 2006 World Cup which was hosted in Germany, greeting the goalscorers of the 2013 Champions League final between Bayern Munich and Borussia Dortmund, and becoming – in remixed form – an anthem of the Bayern side, ‘Seven Nation Army’ is also entwined with German football, and sometimes sung by Germany’s supporters – so that it remained present in Brazil even beyond Italy’s early elimination.

Germany’s World Cup final opponents Argentina are known for a vocal support and an ability to produce an array of innovative chants – which sometimes descend towards the bawdy. ‘Vamos, vamos, Argentina’ encodes a reference to a brothel; and at a previous World Cup Argentinians sang in memory of their Brazilian counterparts, ‘They’re all black, they’re all sexual deviants, everybody knows Brazil is in mourning’. For the occasion of a World Cup in the home of their fiercest rivals, Argentina’s supporters devised a brand new song, to the tune of Creedence Clearwater Revival’s ‘Bad Moon Rising’. Entitled ‘Brasil, decime qué se siente’, when translated into English, ‘Brazil, tell me how it feels’ reads:

Brazil, tell me how it feels

To have your Dad in your house,

I swear that even as years pass

We will never forget

That Diego tricked you

That Cani scored against you

You’ve been crying ever since Italy

You’re going to see Messi

The cup will be brought to us

Maradona is greater than Pele

The chant became so popular that it spread beyond the supporters to the centre of the Argentinian squad. Argentina’s players were videoed singing ‘Brasil, decime qué se siente’ in their changing room as they progressed towards their semi-final against the Netherlands.

The culturally outstanding chant of the tournament belonged to the Americans. With its beginnings over a decade ago in the United States Naval Academy – and in Navy football, American style – ‘I believe that we will win’ ascended rapidly throughout the World Cup, usurping the traditional three-syllable utterance ‘USA!’, to become one of the hallmarks not only of the US team but of the entire competition. Impelled by ESPN, who used it for its World Cup commercial, the chant soon grew to dominate in the bars of America and at public screenings. On the page, ‘I believe that we can win’ initially appears debased, a reduction of the football chant to absurdity: its words offering only the slightest of sentiments, a simple belief that the essence of sport – a physical competition in which the winner is uncertain – remains its essence. Yet when performed, the chant is both powerful and memorable, drawing from gospel music in its call-and-response and simple rhythms, which drive towards a crescendo.

Technical Innovations and The Time of the Game

Technological innovation – not usually one of association football’s bedfellows – abounded on the pitch for this World Cup. Goal-line technology was implemented for the first time, courtesy of the German company GoalControl – who beat off the challenge of rivals including Hawk-Eye, before their technology was implemented in competition at last year’s Confederations Cup. GoalControl’s setup involves fourteen cameras, each capable of taking five-hundred photographs per second. It thereby determines in real-time whether the ball has crossed the goal-line, and whether a goal should be awarded or play allowed to continue. Its decision incontrovertible, a message is passed wirelessly to a watch worn about the referee’s wrist. Despite working perfectly, the system caused hilarity when an irate BBC commentator Jonathan Pearce misunderstood its functioning and railed against being so deceived.

The other bold innovation of the World Cup has in fact already been a feature of Brazilian domestic football for eight years. This was the ‘vanishing spray’, a white foam which referees may use in an attempt to ensure that defenders remain the requisite ten yards from the ball upon attacking free-kicks. So during the tournament referees sprayed a white mark by the site of the stationary ball, then a horizontal line by the feet of defenders – meant to keep them at bay, and disappearing after a minute or so on the playing surface. Hitherto used in the domestic leagues of Brazil, Argentina, and the United States, there is no conclusive evidence that the spray contributes to more goals scored from free-kicks. Still an eminently sensible if only partial solution to a real problem, the spray has been ratified for the forthcoming seasons in Italy, Spain, and France, and will feature in the UEFA Champions League. While the English Premier League first proposed compiling a series of reports on the issue, and allowing the spray from 2015 at the earliest, it has ceded ground and will now introduce it too in 2014-15. The Germans are still contemplating whether to use it for the coming season.

Away from the pitch, The Time of the Game drew upon a variety of interconnected technologies – televisions, and the other screens through which we watch; cameras, which as facets of mobile phones and tablet computers have become extensions of ourselves, and allow us to share images seamlessly; and online social networks – to provide an interactive history of how the world saw the World Cup final. A collaborative project devised by the writer Teju Cole, and achieved alongside software artist Jer Thorp, and artist and developer Mario Klingemann, The Time of the Game describes itself as ‘a synchronized global view of the World Cup final’. Before Germany and Argentina kicked off, Cole asked his 160,000 Twitter followers to post photographs of their screens as they watched the game, noting the minute of action and their own location, and using the hashtag #thetimeofthegame.

Collecting all the submissions which used the hashtag – and those too which used the tag #timeofthegame – resulted in a body of over 2,000 images. The Time of the Game collates these images and shows them chronologically. Fixed and centred upon the viewing screen – most often a television, but also frequently a laptop or tablet – the photographs flash consecutively across the 120 minutes of football played. So The Time of the Game offers a unique perspective, a fractured collage of the World Cup final, and it can be viewed with an eye for the football on display: showing players’ expressions, decisive moments, even differences in coverage between broadcasters from different nations. But more than this, it provides the specifics of how people watched the World Cup – the devices which they used, their surroundings, the materiality of their lives – and a broader sense of a communal experience shared equally among people between different time zones, parts of different cultures, and living with differing circumstances.

As Cole wrote when introducing the project, ‘We live in different time zones, out of sync but aware of each other. Then the game begins and we enter the same time: the time of the game.’ While the images are ‘formally satisfying’ because the focus on the screen affords a ‘frame within a frame’, in an interview with The Atlantic Cole conceptualises the cumulative result as an investigation of ”public time’ […] which is the chronological equivalent of ‘public space’.’ Indeed, The Time of the Game plays thoroughly with the concepts of public and private. It seems to publicise the private space as much as it makes the public space intimate; and contrasts the public sphere of football – which moves beyond the playing of the game, and beyond its broadcasters and analysts, to the discussions we share about football with others – with the individual act of sitting, often alone, and staring and viewing. In addition to the full thread of pictures, it is possible to select via the site a range of images based on time or location: selecting all photographs taken, for instance, in Brooklyn, or in the 45th minute, or for the thirty-minute duration of extra time.

Evaluating the World Cup: Groups E-H

France

An indifferent World Cup for France was encapsulated by their 1-0 defeat in the quarter-finals against Germany, in one of the tournament’s most disappointing and uninspiring games. France had started the World Cup in blistering form, scoring eight goals in their opening matches against Honduras and Switzerland. Karim Benzema proved particularly impressive, scoring three of the goals and finding himself an early contender for the Golden Boot. But manager Didier Deschamps vacillated over his place in the starting eleven. Against Honduras he had started as the central striker in France’s 4-3-3, with Mathieu Valbuena and Antoine Griezmann as the wide attackers. Yet despite two goals, for the game against Switzerland he was moved out to the left, with Olivier Giroud brought in to head the attack. Needing only a draw from their final group game against Ecuador to guarantee their qualification for the next round, Benzema was restored as the team’s striker, the midfield was reconfigured, and both Benzema and France were flat as the game finished 0-0.

In the round of sixteen, France laboured against Nigeria with some poor play in the final third, before two late goals secured their passage: the first a header by Paul Pogba from a corner which Vincent Enyeama grossly misjudged, the second an injury-time own goal. Griezmann had replaced Giroud and Benzema was moved forward with half an hour remaining; and this brought a qualitative improvement so that, against Germany, Griezmann started the game while Giroud was on the bench. France, however, fell behind in the thirteenth minute and never looked like getting back into the encounter. Their performance was devoid of energy, urgency, and quality up against a strong German defence.

Perhaps Deschamps rotated too much in the group stage; or perhaps this French side is simply inconsistent, and struggled to raise its game when it most mattered. It was and remains a peculiarly inexperienced squad, the third least-capped in the tournament, with only two players possessing more than fifty caps. While France’s first-choice central midfield trio of Pogba, Yohan Cabaye, and Blaise Matuidi are all talented, they struggle to remain present for ninety minutes of games and currently lack the ability to excel at the very top of the sport.

Switzerland

Possessing one of the youngest squads in the tournament, with a host of capable youngsters competing for places in the attack, Switzerland’s proactive strategy was undone against France, but saw them progress as group runners-up after victories over Ecuador and Honduras. Boasting two of the most attacking full-backs on display in Ricardo Rodriguez and Stephan Lichtsteiner, and the midfield creativity of Granit Xhaka allied to the directness of Xherdan Shaqiri, Switzerland can be an engaging team to watch. Shaqiri scored a hat-trick in their final group match against Honduras, running off Josip Drmic in a more advanced role. Up against Argentina in the round of sixteen, Switzerland reverted to a more cautious style, and limited Argentina’s chances before succumbing to a goal – created by Lionel Messi, scored by Angel di Maria – deep into extra time, with only a minute to go before an otherwise impending penalty shooutout. Having managed Switzerland since 2008, this was Ottmar Hitzfeld’s last tournament before his retirement from coaching. Vladimir Petkovic is his replacement.

Ecuador

Ecuador’s play was focused down the flanks, with Antonio Valencia and Jefferson Montero meant to supply crosses for Felipe Caicedo and the emergent Enner Valencia. Establishing himself in the national side after an excellent season for Pachuca in Mexico, Enner Valencia scored all three of Ecuador’s goals during the group stage, and thus won for himself a move to West Ham, who are believed to have paid around £12 million to bolster their attack. His goals ultimately proved insufficient for Ecuador’s hopes: despite prevailing 2-1 against Honduras and drawing against France, their opening defeat against Switzerland proved decisive and they finished third in their group.

Honduras

Impressive two years ago at the Olympics, when their under-23 side played a fluid passing game before being cruelly beaten in the quarter-finals by Brazil, Honduras took an ageing squad to the World Cup, featuring such veterans as Maynor Figueroa, Victor Bernardez, Wilson Palacios, Oscar Boniek Garcia, and Carlo Costly. They conceded eight goals and scored only once as they departed with three defeats. Their manager, Luis Fernandez Suarez – who managed Ecuador to the last sixteen in 2006 – has subsequently resigned from his post.

Argentina

Much like their counterparts Brazil – and despite possessing a greater wealth of established attacking talent – Argentina were built around one man, in their case Lionel Messi. They began the tournament conservatively, as they played five across the back against Bosnia and left Fernando Gago out of the side. A fixture of Alejandro Sabella’s first eleven throughout qualification, Gago was widely perceived before the tournament began as crucial to this Argentine team. With Messi, Gonzalo Higuain, Sergio Aguero, Ezequiel Lavezzi, Rodrigo Palacio, and Angel di Maria to choose from for the attacking positions, and utilising a front three which could readily become a front four with Di Maria breaking down the left, Gago was responsible for linking what could otherwise prove a disengaged defence and attack. Without Gago against Bosnia, Argentina struggled, their play improving after he was brought on at half-time. Reverting to a 4-3-3 with a flexible attack, Gago played against Iran and Nigeria; and twice more Argentina eked out narrow wins.

In the round of sixteen against Switzerland, Sabella retained the same setup, but Argentina were less convincing still as they won by virtue of a single goal scored in the last moments of extra time. Sabella changed things for the quarter-final game against Belgium. Gago was replaced in the midfield by Lucas Biglia and Federico Fernandez was replaced at centre-back by Martin Demichelis. The idea was for Biglia to sit alongside Javier Mascherano, and to provide defensive solidity just ahead of two deep central defenders; while in the attack, Messi became playmaker as well as goal threat, dropping into a number ten position to orchestrate Argentina’s attacking play. Argentina were still focused on counter attacking. But with defensive full-backs and Di Maria falling to an early injury, their play became increasingly narrow and reliant upon Messi.

Again they won through, holding on after an early goal scored by Higuain. Then in the semi-final against the Netherlands, both sides cancelled each other out before Argentina prevailed on penalties. Thus Argentina reached the World Cup final without particularly impressing, and without having beaten a team by more than a single goal. Despite bright moments at the beginning of both halves, in the final against Germany they were dominated throughout the midfield, and couldn’t respond after Mario Gotze’s goal in extra time. Aguero, suffering from an injury which had ruled him out beyond the group stage, was brought on after forty-five minutes, but couldn’t offer the width and running which had been provided by Lavezzi. Palacio and Gago came on in the last ten minutes of normal time, with Palacio spurning a chance early in extra time which would have given Argentina the lead.

Argentina took the oldest of all squads to the World Cup, but their key attacking players remain in their mid-twenties and ought to be available come 2018. While they will need to revitalise their midfield and defence, just as pressing is the need to forge a system that doesn’t result in Messi, Higuain and Aguero simply getting in one another’s way, or playing only as individuals in a limited counter-attacking side.

Nigeria

With Emmanuel Emenike consolidated at the head of the Nigerian attack, in their opening game they played in a fairly narrow 4-3-3, failing to break down the Iranian defence as the match finished 0-0. For their second game, against Bosnia, coach Stephen Keshi made some alterations: replacing central midfielder Ramon Azeez with the more offensive Michel Babatunde, and swapping Victor Moses for Peter Odemwingie, who was given license to stretch play down the right and provide an additional goalscoring threat. These changes worked well, with Odemwingie scoring the game’s winning goal. Despite falling to a 2-3 defeat in their final group game against Argentina – with Ahmed Musa scoring both of Nigeria’s goals – Nigeria progressed with four points and went on to meet France in the round of sixteen. Moses replaced Babatunde at the head of the midfield, but Nigera couldn’t capitalise in the attack and – after midfielder Ogenyi Onazi was forced from the game owing to a bad tackle by Blaise Matuidi – suffered two late goals.

Keshi’s position as Nigeria manager remains uncertain, but otherwise Nigeria’s future looks promising. Of the host of young midfielders and attackers already established within the national setup – including Onazi, Babatunde, and Azeez – Ahmed Musa would appear to be one of the best prospects in world football, a regular goalscorer for CSKA Moscow and having already won 41 caps at the age of just twenty-one.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

A disappointing tournament for the Bosnians, who beat Iran comfortably in their final group game, but exited in the group stage thanks to their defeat against Nigeria. Roma’s Miralem Pjanic impressed in the centre of the pitch, and Ferencvaros’s Muhamed Besic – a transfer target for Everton – worked effectively in a more defensive role beside him. However, in the attack they failed to take their chances. Pjanic is twenty-four and Besic twenty-one, but Bosnian captain Emir Spahic and playmaker Zvjezdan Misimovic are in the twilight of their careers; and the side will have expected more from their long-established forwards, Edin Dzeko and Vedad Ibisevic.

Iran

Iran went into their final group match with one point, knowing that a win against Bosnia might see them through to the next round. Well organised by Carlos Queiroz, their hopes were high after securing a draw against Nigeria and holding out until the final seconds versus Argentina. After conceding twice, however, the prospect of a late comeback following Reza Ghoochannejhad’s goal in the eighty-second minute was dashed when, mere moments later, Bosnia scored their third of the game. The game finished 3-1 and the Iranians left the pitch distraught, feeling themselves to have come close to the second round for the first time in the country’s footballing history.

Germany

Rewarded for placing faith in Joachim Low – despite the considerable doubts raised by consecutive near misses across recent tournaments – the future looks prosperous for the new world champions. Thomas Muller, Mesut Ozil, Mario Gotze, Andre Schurrle, Toni Kroos, Mats Hummels, and Jerome Boateng are all young; they have Marco Reus to return and Julian Draxler and Max Meyer waiting to establish themselves; and Ilkay Gundogan too, out with a back injury over the last year, who may prove the long term partner for and eventual successor to Bastian Schweinsteiger in the middle of the pitch. Schweinsteiger is still only twenty-nine, and likely to remain part of things through to the next World Cup.

Germany are not without issues. Though they have experimented with a false nine, played Muller at the head of the attack through the opening stages of the tournament, and won it by virtue of a goal scored by Gotze, still they looked a more coherent side once Miroslav Klose was restored in the quarter-final against France. As a traditional striker, lethal in the opposition penalty area, Klose maintains his position and forces opposition centre-backs to defend, allowing his teammates space. To excel without him, Germany will have to make the false nine equally effective, or they will have to turn back to Mario Gomez or to the youngsters Kevin Volland and Pierre-Michel Lasogga.

As Philipp Lahm’s stint in midfield during the tournament showed, Germany also lack quality in the full-back positions. This is a problem thrown into stark relief by Lahm’s shock retirement from international football. Just thirty, a model of fitness and intelligence on the pitch, Lahm could easily have played on through 2018. Without him, Germany will look for improvement from the likes of left-backs Erik Durm and Christian Gunter, and may toy with converting a midfielder to fill in at right-back.

For more on Germany, see: ‘Germany 1-0 Argentina: An Analysis of the 2014 World Cup Final’.

United States

Managed by Jurgen Klinsmann – who was responsible for one of the more contentious selection decisions prior to the World Cup, leaving out the USA’s all-time top goalscorer, Landon Donovan – the USA started strongly with a 2-1 victory over Ghana. After losing Jozy Altidore to injury in that match, they switched from a four to a five man midfield, leaving Clint Dempsey as their lone striker. Conceding an early goal in their second game against Portugal, they equalised and then took the lead thanks to Jermaine Jones and Dempsey, only for Portugal to agonisingly draw level in the fifth minute of injury time. Yet given Portugal’s 4-0 defeat against Germany, the USA could afford to lose marginally against the Germans in their final group game and still go through. And so it was, as they lost 1-0, allowing both sides to progress to the round of sixteen.

There the USA faced Belgium and defended valiantly, until they were undone by fresh legs in extra time. Dempsey, Jones, DaMarcus Beasley, Tim Howard, and Donovan too may have seen their last World Cup action. Michael Bradley and Altidore will remain pivotal to the team. Twenty-one-year-old DeAndre Yedlin impressed with bold and energetic runs from right-back.

Portugal

Thumped in their first match against Germany and fortunate to equalise late against the USA, Portugal were effectively out of the World Cup after their second game. Perpetually without a centre forward of note, their 4-3-3 formation was but a pretence, their attack wholly reliant upon Cristiano Ronaldo who was afforded the freedom of the pitch. Yet Ronaldo was some way off his best, and Portugal too short of ideas elsewhere to compensate. Their squad was the second oldest in the competition, and their exit suggested another generation of talented Portuguese footballers who have failed to reach their potential on the international stage. Looking beyond the collective age of their defence, even Ronaldo will be thirty-three by the time of the next World Cup.

Ghana

Ghana took the youngest squad to Brazil of all the thirty-two competing nations, and they were slightly unfortunate not to progress beyond the group stage. They were the only side throughout the competition not to fall to Germany, pulling ahead of the Germans before drawing their match 2-2; but ironically they fell just short against the USA and Portugal and ended at the bottom of a tough group. Still, with Daniel Opare and Jonathan Mensah in defence, Kwadwo Asamoah and Emmanuel Agyemang-Badu in midfield, and the Ayew brothers and Christian Atsu in the attack, Ghana should be strong over the coming years.

Belgium

So much discussed, so widely tipped, possessing so many players who are established at top club sides throughout Europe, Belgium could hardly be classed as dark horses going into the World Cup. Reaching the quarter-finals before losing to Argentina, they picked up the results expected of them without ever excelling on the pitch. Like Argentina, they failed to win a game by more than a single goal; and they scored late in each of the matches they won. But their squad is still young, and capable of progressing intact through another four-year cycle. Their striking talents may be the envy of the world: Romelu Lukaku, Christian Benteke, and Divock Origi all look capable modern forwards, powerful and mobile and adept at bringing others into play; and they are supported in the wide positions by Eden Hazard, Kevin Mirallas, Nacer Chadli, and Adnan Januzaj. Kevin de Bruyne showed his ability playing as a number ten; but Belgium perhaps lack a deeper midfielder with a range of passing and composure on the ball. Aside from a player who can connect defence and attack and bring some control to their play, Belgium also struggle for options in both full-back positions.

Algeria

The highest ranked African side at the beginning of the World Cup, Algeria progressed to the round of sixteen with a 4-2 victory over South Korea and a 1-1 draw against Russia. Centre-back Rafik Halliche and star attacking midfielder Sofiane Feghouli were the only constants as manager Vahid Halilhodzic proved more than willing to change his line-up and alter his team’s style of play; but Algeria were most effective and most exciting to watch pressing through the midfield and playing balls in behind the opposition defence for Islam Slimani to attack. In the round of sixteen, their pressing and relentless pace on the counter caused Germany’s high defensive line problems, mitigated by Manuel Neuer sweeping up beyond the confines of his penalty box. They eventually lost the game, but only 2-1 after taking the eventual champions to extra time.

Though Halilhodzic has left Algeria to return to manage Trabzonspor – with Christian Gourcuff his replacement – Algeria possess a core of players in Halliche, Feghouli, Yacine Brahimi, Nabil Bentaleb, Saphir Taider, Slimani, and El Arbi Soudani who ought to be able to maintain the high standards they set in Brazil.

Russia

Russia are not as strong today as they were several years ago: though they failed to qualify for the World Cup in 2010, the squad which reached the semi-finals of Euro 2008 saw genuine competition up front, the magnificent talent of Andrey Arshavin playing behind whichever striker was picked to start, a strong midfield comprised of Konstantin Zyryanov, Sergei Semak, and Igor Semshov, and Yuri Zhirkov and Aleksandr Anyukov full of running at left and right full-back. Russia’s captain and key midfielder this time round, Roman Shirokov, was forced to withdraw from the squad prior to the start of competition with a knee injury. So Russia didn’t go into the World Cup full of confidence, but they still managed to disappoint with three lacklustre, overly conservative performances, which saw them manage only two goals and two draws. Perhaps most frustrating was manager Fabio Capello’s reluctance to use Alan Dzagoev, Russia’s most creative midfielder, as anything more than a late option off the bench. Capello blamed a lazer pen directed towards the eyes of goalkeeper Igor Akinfeev for his side’s elimination; but it was Capello’s own performance that was met with derision among the Russian media, politicians, and populace at large.

South Korea

Tidy through the midfield and looking to bring Son Heung-Min into play from the left side of the attack, South Korea struggled at both ends of the pitch, managing only a draw against Russia. They thereby compounded a poor showing at this World Cup from the Asian Football Confederation, whose sides – South Korea, Japan, Iran, and Australia – failed to win a single game.

South Korea are short of a goalscorer. Two of the strangest transfers in European football over recent years have seen Park Chu-Young sign for Arsenal and Ji Dong-Won sign this summer for Borussia Dortmund. Neither player produced the performances at their previous clubs which would seem to compel such moves; after signing in the summer of 2011, Park managed only one league appearance for Arsenal in three seasons before being released, and it will be interesting to view Ji’s progress over the coming season at Dortmund. Still, South Korea have a young squad, with a balance of players between the Asian, the German, and the English leagues, and they will look to build on their strategy for next time.

What’s Wrong with Brazil? Evaluating the World Cup: Groups A-D

This first set of evaluations of the teams who competed at the 2014 World Cup in Brazil comprises the participants of groups A-D, listed in the order in which they finished the group stage. I explore how the teams’ tournaments progressed, and suggest the course of their futures. And in this first piece, I analyse at length the range of problems within Brazil’s squad, which implicates a crucial flaw in the country’s footballing philosophy over the last twenty years. This is a period which has, admittedly, seen Brazil lift two World Cups and reach one further final. Yet it has also witnessed a marked deterioration in Brazil’s style of play, and has resulted at this juncture in weakness on the pitch.

Brazil

Many of the analyses of Brazil’s semi-final defeat against Germany have been wildly or gravely portentous rather than reflective: they have focused on the potential ramifications of the defeat for Brazilian football, taking its apparently sorry state as a given rather than attempting to identify its precise nature and causes. Talk of ‘Maracanazo II’, the ‘Ghosts’ of Maracanazo returning, and of a fate worse than that defeat on home soil in what was effectively the final of the 1950 World Cup, seems both simplified and sensationalist. While reminiscence of the surprise 2-1 loss to Uruguay undoubtedly added to the weight of pressure which this Brazil side evidently struggled against, the Maracanazo cannot sensibly be said to have tormented the Brazilian mind and the Brazilian game for sixty-four years.

After making the quarter-final stage at the next World Cup in Switzerland, Brazil went on to win three of the next four tournaments, in Sweden in 1958, Chile in 1962, and Mexico in 1970. Against Uruguay – the bogeymen of the tale as much as the Maracana stadium or the concept of home defeat – they maintained a strong record, unfettered, for instance, as they beat their rivals 3-1 in Guadalajara in the semi-finals of Mexico 1970. Among the Brazilian people, following the 7-1 loss against Germany last Tuesday, despite the obvious disappointment in the stands, defeat seemed to be taken with dignity and grace. There was little of the tension in the streets which had been posited as an outcome of Brazil’s elimination, no violent outpouring despite the extent of anger felt and expressed in the build up to the tournament.

Looking at Brazil’s success in 1970 in Mexico, however, as much as Brazil’s attackers – Pele, Rivelino, Jairzinho, Tostao – and their goalscoring full-back, Carlos Alberto, remain emblems of the beautiful game, just as praised and equally as important to the side’s success were their two central midielders, Clodoaldo and Gerson. And looking back to their first World Cup triumph in 1958 and to Didi, and to their 1982 side – fondly remembered as one of the best ever despite falling to eventual winners Italy – and to Socrates and Zico, the great Brazilian sides of the past have been defined by their central midfield players as much as by their forwards and strikers.

Even in the attack at this moment in time, Brazil look relatively weak, with Fred a poor target man, supporting players like Hulk and Jo decidedly limited, and Alexandre Pato a spent force at just twenty-four years old. Yet with Bernard and Oscar, and most of all with Neymar, there is room for optimism regarding the future. The central defence will perhaps not be of the utmost concern given the range of players established and emerging in the position; but at full-back, with Dani Alves and Maicon towards the end of their careers, Brazil urgently require new talent. For a position which has been so important to Brazilian football – and which was so well served for a decade and a half by Roberto Carlos and Cafu – Marcelo is a capable attacker, but too often crude and reckless defensively, while Rafael, Fabio, and Danilo have stagnated at club level and are struggling for an international opportunity.

Most of all though, Brazil lack accomplished central midfielders. In fact, it is arguable that they have lacked a playmaker for the position – someone with a range of passing and the intelligence to dictate the play – since the 80s. Italia 90 all the way through until the World Cup final at France 98 was the Dunga era: a supremely effective defensive midfielder, his short passing and sitting in front of the defence came to symbolise what many thought of as a functional but dull Brazil. Brazil’s World Cup triumph at USA 94 vindicated the approach, as it was Brazil’s first World Cup win – and first final appearance – in twenty-four years. Yet that side received much criticism for its pragmatic and unadventurous approach, Dunga sitting alongside the hardworking Mauro Silva, the team heavily reliant on their two star forwards, Romario and Bebeto. By 1998, Brazil had more exciting wide players to call on in Roberto Carlos, Cafu, Leonardo, and Rivaldo; Ronaldo now starred alongside Bebeto up front; but with such talent to break forward from the wide positions, and with Ronaldo able to score goals out of nothing, even less emphasis was placed on the ball-playing capacity of the centre of midfield.

Four of these superstars remained and excelled during Brazil’s success in South Korea and Japan in 2002. Ronaldo and Rivaldo now had Ronaldinho playing behind them, and Cafu and Robert Carlos were given advanced wing-back roles. Yet the centre of midfield featured Gilberto Silva and Kleberson. In fact, Gilberto Silva was always a capable box-to-box player, a lack of pace masking workrate and good positional sense in the attack as well as the defence. For Arsenal, he chipped in with the occasional goal; but for Brazil he was asked to cover for other players, offering running and a limited passing game. Across the early 2000s until the unsuccessful World Cup campaign of 2006, he was joined by Emerson – perhaps Brazil’s most accomplished midfielder of the period, and the most successful for his clubs, but deep-lying for the international team, and often injured at key moments – and by Ze Roberto, Juninho Paulista, and Juninho Pernambucano.

Ze Roberto and Juninho Paulista offered genuine dribbling ability. Juninho Paulista, the most attacking of all these players, had started the World Cup in 2002 as part of the first eleven, but was dropped in favour of Kleberson at the quarter-final stage. Ze Roberto played alongside Emerson in 2006, but he was more of a wide player at heart, and played in a supporting role behind Kaka, Ronaldinho, Adriano, and Ronaldo. By 2010, Felipe Melo was occupying one of the midfield berths, a retrenchment that proved costly as he was sent off against the Netherlands in a quarter-final defeat.

So the cautious and overtly physical approach taken by Luiz Felipe Scolari this time round was far from new, but exacerbated by the lack of talent elsewhere on the pitch. Luiz Gustavo sat and made a nuisance of himself just in front of the Brazilian defenders; and Paulinho or Fernandinho were essentially asked to cover the expanse of ground that lay between defence and attack. It did not work. Yet while Brazil are short of players in other key positions, any return towards an ethos which would see them attempt to develop play through the centre of the pitch seems unlikely given their dearth of midfield options. Luiz Gustavo and Lucas Leiva may be more defensive, but they and Paulinho, Fernandinho, and Ramires offer much the same in their lack of flair and composure on the ball, being primarily runners, all prone to cynical challenges. Hernanes was once the bright hope for the Brazilian midfield, but he is now twenty-nine, has never established himself for Brazil, and lacks pace. There are no obvious prospects on the horizon, with Lucas Moura of Paris Saint-Germain in the mould of Brazil’s other young attacking players.

Mexico

After advancing from the group stage unbeaten and with seven points, Mexico were two minutes from progressing against the Netherlands in the round of sixteen – before succumbing to a late Wesley Sneijder strike and to Klaas-Jan Huntelaar’s disputed penalty. Their standout player, the goalkeeper Guillermo Ochoa, remains without a club; but what marked Mexico above all was their cohesion, emboldened by Miguel Herrara from the sidelines, his 5-3-2 defensively solid and quick and incisive on the attack. While their defensive mainstays – Marquez, Rodriguez, and Salcido – will have played their last World Cup, they can continue to call on their mobile attackers, Andres Guardado, Hector Herrera, and Giovani dos Santos. Javier Hernandez’s goalscoring record remains impressive, but his all-round game is proving insufficient to entice both his international and his club managers.

Croatia

Possessing two of the best central midfield players in the competition in Luka Modric and Ivan Rakitic – who will line up next year for Real Madrid and Barcelona respectively – Croatia seemed to lose heart after their controversial defeat in the tournament’s opening game against Brazil. Despite thrashing Cameroon, they succumbed meekly to Mexico to finish third in their group. The likes of Modric, Mario Mandzukic, Nikica Jelavic and Vedran Corluka should be about for one more World Cup, but this squad will perhaps peak at the next European Championship in two years’ time – when they will hope to gain from the youth of Sime Vrsaljko, Ante Rebic, Mateo Kovacic, and Alen Halilovic.

Cameroon

Coming away from the group stages with the worst goal difference of all sides in the competition, Cameroon’s World Cup was disastrous. Their preparations marked by a row over bonuses, the squad was further blighted upon departure by allegations of match fixing. Cameroon should possess a strong spine with Nicolas N’Koulou, Aurelien Chedjou, Alex Song and Joel Matip, and they have some capable forwards. But they sorely lack direction and a figurehead on the pitch, as Samuel Eto’o’s international career winds down amid infighting and acrimony.

Netherlands

With the perspective in the country that their side would struggle to advance beyond the group stage, the Netherlands’ progress to the semi-finals – and to a third-place finish after beating Brazil – must be considered a success. It is a tribute to Louis van Gaal’s ability to mould and unite a team; while on the pitch, Arjen Robben proved himself one of the world’s best players. But the Dutch – such a force at international level since finishing World Cup runners-up in 1974 – may have to be thankful for what they’ve witnessed rather than looking forward with renewed hope.

There is the sense that they are not producing players like they used to. While Ajax come foremost in the world’s perceptions about the Dutch game, and continue to be viewed as providing a sort of finishing school for rounded young footballers, they and Feyenoord are equally responsible for providing today’s new Dutch talent. The young midfielders and defenders Memphis Depay, Georginio Wijnaldum, Kevin Strootman, Jordy Clasie, Daley Blind, Bruno Martins Indi, and Stefan de Vrij are all capable. But the Dutch appear to lack an outstanding prospect in the attack, with Robben and Robin van Persie to be thirty-four by 2018. This is after two decades which have seen Patrick Kluivert, Dennis Bergkamp, Marc Overmars and Clarence Seedorf, Ruud van Nistelrooy, and Robben and Van Persie alongside Wesley Sneijder and Rafael van der Vaart, all establish themselves early on the world stage. Along with Depay, Jean-Paul Boetius, Tonny Vilhena, Marco van Ginkel, and Adam Maher are attacking-minded midfielders with some promise. Up front, the prospects are rawer still: Luc Castaignos, with Twente after an unsuccessful stint at Inter Milan; Jurgen Locadia at PSV; and the seventeen-year-old Richairo Zivkovic, who has recently moved to Ajax. The Netherlands will need some of these players to secure big moves and start prospering before the next World Cup.

Van Gaal, of course, is away to Manchester United. Guus Hiddink is his immediate replacement. However, in a move slightly bemusing for its apparent logic, Hiddink will remain the manager of the Netherlands only until the end of Euro 2016. After that tournament, Daley Blind – currently an assistant to Hiddink – will take over, provisionally until the end of the 2018 World Cup.

Chile

Edged by Brazil on penalties in the round of sixteen, Chile were – like Mexico and Colombia – one of the tournament’s most engaging teams. Perhaps the most flexible side in the tournament tactically, they were capable of adapting their formation at will. Through the energetic wing-backs Mauricio Isla and Eugenio Mena, a resolute 5-3-2 when defending readily became a lively 3-5-2 on the attack. Remarkably, of their seven most defensive players – once Isla and Mena dropped, and with Marcelo Diaz and Charles Aranguiz ahead of the back three – not one stands taller than 5 feet and 10 inches, or 1.78 metres.

Mobile throughout the midfield, the 3-5-2 even turned into a 3-4-3 as Jorge Valdivia, Arturo Vidal, or Felix Gutierrez advanced through the centre to play just behind the two forwards. Alexis Sanchez ran off Eduardo Vargas, and Chile pressed relentlessly up the pitch. Chile sometimes struggle to score the goals their football would seem to deserve, but with many of their players only in their mid-twenties, and a committed coach in Jorge Sampaoli, they will remain an enticing side to watch.

Spain

As the reigning world and consecutive European champions fell appallingly from grace – losing their first two games, against the Netherlands and Chile, 1-5 and 0-2 – manager Vicente del Bosque was heavily criticised in some quarters, with it even suggested that he had failed to add a scrap to the successful side he inherited after 2008. While a side can hardly remain at the pinnacle of the sport over such a period without astute management, still Del Bosque erred significantly this time round. The move to a more direct style, with Diego Costa up front, proved ineffective and did not play to the strengths of the rest of the squad. The strained reluctance to field Cesc Fabregas and David Villa was bizarre.

Though the demise of tiki-taka has been widely bemoaned and – more commonly – celebrated, Spain’s failure in Brazil reflects less the obsolescence of the style of play, more how other teams have adapted to combat it and how difficult it is to pull off with ageing players, who are less able to press. Spain have enough emerging talent to rebuild however they see fit. They may stick with Costa as a target man, and utilise the flanks with players including Pedro, Gerard Deulofeu, and Iker Muniain; or with Isco, Thiago, Koke, and Javi Martinez, they have a new generation capable of revitalising a possession-based approach.

Australia

The lowest-ranked team going into the tournament, at first glance Australia were typically plucky in defeat. Yet – aside from the game against the Netherlands, in which they briefly led 2-1, and which saw Tim Cahill’s magnificent left-footed volley – they were well beaten by Chile and Spain. As Tim Cahill and Mark Bresciano – both thirty-four – depart the international arena, Australia’s squad shows some promising young players, but a severe lack of experience at the top level of club football.

Colombia

Managed by Jose Pekerman, Colombia were one of the standout sides of the World Cup. Full of goals in the group stages and comfortably dispatching Uruguay in the round of sixteen, they overcame the absence of their star striker, Radamel Falcao, and in James Rodriguez had arguably the tournament’s best player, and one who drew neutrals to the side. In front of a solid back six, with two holding midfielders sitting in front of the four in defence, Cuadrado impressed while Rodriguez – playing out wide and as a support striker, but mostly as a number ten – scored goal after goal, finishing the tournament with six goals and the Golden Boot. Alas, like Chile, Colombia fell to a marginal defeat at the hands of Brazil after a scrappy physical contest.

A €45 million signing for Monaco from Porto just one year ago, the twenty-three-year-old James is now in the process of completing a move to Real Madrid for double that amount. He will presumably play as a number ten behind a forward line which could comprise Cristiano Ronaldo, Karim Benzema, and Gareth Bale. Still owning Angel di Maria, Isco, and Jese, and having signed Toni Kroos for a midfield which already contains Luka Modric, Xabi Alonso, Sami Khedira, and Asier Illarramendi, Madrid possess a moderately sized squad but with a baffling hoard of talent in midfield and attack. Angel di Maria will presumably follow Alvaro Morata out the door; but it still seems absurd the way in which a tiny handful of clubs have consolidated so many – in fact, now essentially all – of the world’s top players. This is not good for the game as a whole, and it results in inevitable wastage as great players are misused or struggle for adequate playing time.

Greece

Synonymous with negative, obstructionist football ever since their European Championship success in 2004, Greece lived up to their reputation. They ground their way through the group stage, snatching their only victory in the final seconds of their final group game against Ivory Coast; before succumbing on penalties to Costa Rica in the round of sixteen. This was the last stand for the two remaining heroes of 2004, Giorgos Karagounis and Kostas Katsouranis; but also for longstanding forward Theofanis Gekas, Greece’s third top-scorer of all time, who alas missed the decisive penalty against Costa Rica.

Ivory Coast

Moments from progressing from the group stages against Greece, Ivory Coast will see the fading of a generation of players over the next four years. Didier Drogba, Didier Zokora, and Kolo Toure all have over a hundred caps for the nation, and all are well into their thirties. With Yaya Toure looking tired, Drogba remained the talisman of this side, called upon for their decisive match despite Wilfried Bony’s two goals in the previous two games. Bony and Gervinho will continue to provide Ivory Coast with a dangerous attack; they have Seydou Doumbia and Lacina Traore, both on standby this time round, to come into the squad; while a youthful group of defenders and midfielders have begun gaining international experience.

Japan

A disappointing tournament for Japan, who may have expected more enjoyment from a talented group of players, many of whom ought to be playing at the peak of their careers. Keisuke Honda, Shinji Kagawa, Shinji Okazaki, and captain Makoto Hasebe are all good footballers, and Japan boasted a vastly experienced defence. But they managed only two goals, failing to score against Greece, and being roundly beaten by Colombia.

Costa Rica

One of the surprise packages of the tournament, Costa Rica reached the quarter-finals of the World Cup for the first time. Built around a conservative five man defence, with Celso Borges and Yeltsin Tejeda ahead of the centre-backs, and with Bryan Ruiz and Christian Bolanos running from wide to support Joel Campbell, Costa Rica proved hard to break down and sharp on the break. They deservedly beat Uruguay and Italy to progress from what appeared a difficult group, before beating Greece on penalties, and falling to the Netherlands after more of the same.

The absence of centre-back Oscar Duarte against the Netherlands – owing to a red card accrued against Greece – ought to have been a blow, yet Costa Rica’s defence remained relatively untroubled. However, after playing for an hour with ten men in the previous match, their forwards were evidently worn out. With a good mixture of youth and experience throughout the squad, Costa Rica can look towards building on their overall performance.

Uruguay

Uruguay’s is an ageing and an experienced squad: it was the third oldest and the second most-capped going into the World Cup. Persisting with experience – restricting Gaston Ramirez and Abel Hernandez, who could have added some dribbling ability and pace, to brief cameos from the bench – Uruguay were set up to be defensively solid and to rely on Luis Suarez in the attack. Without him, as they were against Costa Rica in their opening game, and against Colombia – after Suarez’s bite – in the round of sixteen, both Edinson Cavani and the Uruguay attack appeared equally flat. Suarez’s behaviour, while harder to understand and provoking a more visceral response, was ultimately no more grievous than many other things which occur and are perpetrated on the football pitch. Uruguay’s bigger concern will be the extent of the rebuilding they face when the current generation of players retire. Many of this squad – which already looks a little tired – may hang on for one last World Cup.

Italy

Cesare Prandelli, upon taking the Italy job in 2010, had to oversee a process of renewal. Fabio Cannavaro, Gianluca Zambrotta, and Gennaro Gattuso all retired after the 2010 World Cup; and the spectres of Alessandro del Piero and Francesco Totti continued to dwell, with recalls for both players never dismissed as Italy struggled for creativity in the attacking third. Though they reached the final of Euro 2012, Italy came into this World Cup lacking identity. In every match of the group stage, their formation changed. Against England, they played with something approaching a diamond 4-4-2, with Antonio Candreva playing off Mario Balotelli. Despite that side’s 2-1 success, in the next game against Costa Rica, they moved towards a purer 4-3-3, with Candreva wide on the right and Claudio Marchisio wide on the left, between the midfield and Balotelli at the head of the attack. Then in their decisive match against Uruguay, they switched to a back three, with wing-backs and Ciro Immobile playing off Balotelli.

The only constants were Andrea Barzagli as one of the centre-backs, Balotelli as the focal point of the attack, and Andrea Pirlo in the centre of midfield. Even Pirlo’s position changed subtly, as he was pushed slightly wide or forward from his usual deep-lying role, playing alongside two or three from Daniele De Rossi, Marco Verratti, Marchisio, and Thiago Motta. As much as his off-the-field antics amuse or antagonise, Balotelli is often brighter away from the pitch than he is on it: always capable of a match-winning performance, when he isn’t switched on, he offers his side nothing. Not only his goalscoring touch, but the basics of movement and the strength to hold the ball disappear.

After the surprise loss versus Costa Rica, Italy needed something against Uruguay, but fell to a contentious late defeat – having been reduced to ten men, and conceding moments after Luis Suarez’s bite on Giorgio Chiellini went unpunished. Thus Italy were eliminated at the group stage for the second World Cup in a row. Prandelli immediately tendered his resignation, and Italy are now looking for a new manager. Pirlo, at least, has said that he will remain available for selection.

England

England managed to fall short of diminished expectations, failing to win a game in Brazil despite some promising moments in the attack against Italy. They look slight in the centre of defence with no outstanding talents emerging to improve the situation; Joe Hart should feel challenged as England’s number one; Wayne Rooney’s precise function in the side remains unclear; but most pressing of all is the need to reconfigure the midfield, a weakness for over a decade. Steven Gerrard ought to be eased out of the international picture, but England lack options with only Jack Wilshere and Jordan Henderson naturals for a central midfield role.

For more on England at the World Cup, see ‘A Recapitulation of England’s Failings at the World Cup’.

Germany 1 – 0 Argentina: An Analysis of the 2014 World Cup Final

So the 2014 World Cup final took place in Rio’s Estádio Maracanã, Sunday 13 July, kicking off at 4 pm local time. Germany lined up in a 4-3-3 formation. With Manuel Neuer in goal, the back four comprised Benedikt Howedes at left-back, Mats Hummels and Jerome Boateng in the centre of defence, and Philipp Lahm at right-back, expected to fulfil a wider and more adventurous full-back role. Bastian Schweinsteiger sat in the centre of the midfield behind Toni Kroos and Christoph Kramer – making only his fifth appearance for the national side, and his first competitive start, a last-minute replacement for Sami Khedira, so impressive against Brazil, but succumbing to a calf injury in the warm-up. In the attack, Mesut Ozil and Thomas Muller played on the left and the right respectively behind Miroslav Klose.

Argentina utilised something between a 4-2-2-2 and a 4-3-3. With Sergio Romero in goal, and a back four of Marcos Rojo, Ezequiel Garay, Martin Demichelis, and Pablo Zabaleta, Lucas Biglia and Javier Mascherano occupied the two central midfield positions, sitting relatively deep to protect the defence. Ahead of them were Ezequiel Lavezzi and Enzo Perez; with Lionel Messi roaming behind Gonzalo Higuain in the attack. Provisionally, Lavezzi and Perez played as wide attacking midfielders, with Lavezzi starting on the left and Perez on the right, but intending to interchange through the course of the game.

As the first half progressed, both teams found the most joy down the flanks, but especially down their respective right sides. The Argentinians had a strong opening twenty minutes: after four minutes, a pass by Lavezzi down the right found Higuain, whose shot from the right of the six-yard box went across the goalmouth ; and at eight minutes, Lionel Messi burst into the right of the penalty area past Hummels, but couldn’t find anybody with his attempted pull-back. In the twentieth minute, one of the chances of the game was gifted as Kroos carelessly headed the ball beyond his own centre-backs, into the path of Higuain, who found himself through on goal. Higuan snatched at the shot, however, and struck wide from the edge of the area when he should have scored. At the same time, Lahm and Muller were connecting down Germany’s right to build attacks, and to provide crosses into the box. While the tempo of the game remained high throughout the half, with both sides pressing and harrying effectively, the pattern of the game emerged, which saw Germany retaining possession in the midfield and Argentina hoping to break incisively.

Argentina’s 4-2-2-2 was frequently becoming a 4-3-3 on the attack, as Lavezzi moved over to the right and made good use of his pace against Howedes and Hummels, with Messi drifting over to accompany him, and Perez filling in to bolster the left of the Argentine midfield. After just seventeen minutes, Kramer had suffered a nasty blow when, running for the ball, he found himself suddenly sandwiched between two defenders, and his head rebounded violently off Garay’s shoulder. After a pause in play, he continued on, but was forced to retire fifteen minutes later, still visibly dazed and being helped from the pitch. His substitution came as Argentina had a goal disallowed for offside, Higuain several yards ahead of the last German defender when Lavezzi crossed the ball for him to finish. With Khedira and now Kramer injured, and Lahm playing at full-back, Germany found themselves without an obvious midfield replacement, and brought on Andre Schurrle, an attacker. Schurrle moved to the left of the attack, with Ozil moving into the centre of the pitch.

The 4-2-3-1 which has characterised Joachim Low’s long tenure as Germany manager was replaced at the start of this World Cup with a 4-3-3. Muller played as the formation’s nominal front-man, with Ozil and Mario Gotze behind, and with Schweinsteiger and Kroos in the midfield ahead of Lahm, converted from his accustomed full-back position as he was last season under Pep Guardiola for Bayern Munich. With Lahm in the midfield, Per Mertesacker came in at centre-back, and Germany played with four natural centre-backs across the defence. This was the template until the quarter-final against France.

After the tense victory in extra time against Algeria in the previous round, against France Klose was restored to the team at Gotze’s expense, and Lahm was reestablished at right-back. Khedira took his place in the midfield. Schweinsteiger again proved himself adept at midfield defensive work, covering ground and intercepting effectively; Lahm as a natural full-back offered more to Germany there than he could muster in the centre of the field, providing much needed pace, width, and attacking intent down the right flank; and despite his lack of ability outside the box, Klose proved Germany’s best option leading the line, his prowess in the penalty area encouraging the opposition to defend deep, allowing Germany’s attacking midfielders the space in which to play.

Yet the formation against France and for the triumph over Brazil had remained a 4-3-3, with Kroos and Khedira just ahead of Schweinsteiger, and Ozil and Muller either side of Klose: despite his goalscoring ability and his frequent forward runs, Kroos would never linger behind the striker, always retreating to make a compact midfield. Now against Argentina, with Schurrle on and Ozil central, Germany’s formation moved back towards a 4-2-3-1. A unique sort of number ten in that he favours short runs and passes and intelligent movement off the ball rather than prolonged possession and attempted through-passes and shots on goal, Ozil is still a natural for the position, and Low allowed him to play there rather than asking him – or another attacker – to drop deeper to retain the shape of the 4-3-3. Kroos was inevitably required to drop a little as part of the midfield two, playing more resolutely alongside Schweinsteiger.

The interchange between Ozil and Muller has been a key facet of Germany’s game, and a highlight of international football, over the last four years. With Schurrle hugging the left touchline, Ozil frequently moved between the centre and the right of the pitch, receiving passes from Lahm and becoming one of the game’s key players. Nobody on the German side was moving with as much fluidity between the narrow lines of the Argentinian’s tight defence. This encouraged Muller also to wander on occasion, and the first of a flurry of chances before half-time came when he cut the ball back to Schurrle down Germany’s left, only for Schurrle to fire the ball straight at Romero in goal. A moment later, Messi again found space down Argentina’s right, and managed to flick the ball over Neuer, only for Boateng to scramble it clear. Then Ozil beat a couple of defenders and laid the ball off to Kroos on the edge of the Argentine area – but Kroos’s shot was tame, and trickled towards Romero’s outstretched gloves. The final chance of the half – and the closest either side had come to scoring so far – came as Howedes headed against the woodwork from a corner taken by Kroos. While Howedes’ leap was impressive, winning a free header just yards from goal meant that he should have scored.

Within seconds of the second-half commencing, Messi struck from the left of the penalty area agonisingly wide of Neuer’s far post. Argentina looked bright, but the half soon settled into a slower, slightly scrappier affair. The Argentine forwards – now playing solely on the counter, and with Sergio Aguero replacing Lavezzi after the break, entrenching a 4-3-3 but a narrower version, with Messi just behind Aguero and Higuain – began to make more runs across and at the heart of the German defence. Germany were dominating possession and probing, but still going wide in an attempt to carve chances. Since coming on, Schurrle had provided much workrate down the left, but he was rarely venturing to go past Zabaleta and reach the byline. Mascherano and Biglia provided Argentina with a strong spine ahead of Demichelis and Garay, and Boateng routinely cleaned up at the back for Germany, while Schweinsteiger tracked back to make several timely interceptions.

A ball played over the top towards the right of the German penalty area in the fifty-fifth minute encouraged Neuer to race from his goal and to punch the ball clear; but in jumping to do so, he clattered into Higuain, with the foul absurdly given against the attacker. After a foul by Schweinsteiger and a high challenge by Howedes in the first half had brought the game’s first bookings, now two fouls in quick succession saw yellow cards for Aguero and Mascherano.

Messi, who to this point had been the game’s most dangerous player, began dropping deeper to search for the ball. Rodrigo Palacio replaced Higuain in the Argentine attack. Two pieces of clever play by Germany brought abject conclusions, with Howedes fumbling from an advanced position in the Argentine area, and with Kroos again spurning an excellent shooting opportunity after a good ball from Ozil. With five minutes of normal time left, Argentina made their final change of the match, as Fernando Gago replaced Perez. Germany responded by substituting Klose – presumably drawing to an end his World-Cup defining international career – for Gotze.

With no clear opportunities presenting themselves in the final minutes, the game moved on into extra time, and immediately became more open. Schurrle forced another save from Romero. After several forays down the left, a lofted diagonal ball from that side evaded Hummels and put Palacios in on goal, but as Neuer raced out, Palacios lifted wide. Mascherano was fortunate to escape a second yellow card for fouls on Schweinsteiger either side of the half-time break; then Aguero should certainly have gone for catching Schweinsteiger – whose command on the game was only growing – with a fist to the cheekbone, which caused a cut and plenty of blood.

As he returned to the pitch and the players entered the final ten minutes of extra time – as penalties looked increasingly likely – Germany scored. Whether Muller or Gotze, the false-nine experiment has thus far brought meagre returns for Germany, failing to extend their play; but it was unsurprising that Gotze’s fresh legs ultimately proved the difference. Crosses having been delivered from the right for so much of the game, the goal came thanks to a delivery from the left, as Schurrle crossed to Gotze who, to the left of the six-yard box, showed exceptional ability and composure, controlling with his chest before volleying with his left foot over Romero and into the back of the net. Argentina fought to find a way back into the game. Messi headed onto the roof of the net from the edge of the area; and after Mertesacker replaced Ozil, Messi struck a final free-kick from too far out decidedly over the bar. The referee played on beyond the allocated injury time, but Germany held firm, and thus became World Champions.

Lamenting Messi’s role in Argentina’s defeat is sensationalist, if perhaps reflecting the extent to which individualism rules in today’s game. Argentina’s top scorer and the joint-third top scorer in the tournament with four goals, scoring decisively in every match of the group stage and creating the winning goals in the knockouts versus Belgium and Switzerland, even on the night Messi was one of Argentina’s best players. Undeniably fading towards the end of ninety minutes, and offering little aside from his late, desperate attempts in extra time, still Messi came closest to scoring with his run towards the end of the first half and his shot in the opening moments of the second. In the first half in particular, with Hummels bizarrely challenging him for pace rather than attempting to hold him up, Messi ran past Hummels time and time again without receiving adequate support. Built effectively around a compact defence, Argentina lacked fluency in the attack throughout the World Cup, and in the final it was Higuain and Palacios’s squandered chances which proved costly.

Germany’s standout players across the course of competition have been numerous. Hummels had appeared the tournament’s preeminent ball-playing centre-back, and scored two goals from headers against Portugal and France, before struggling defensively in the final. Kroos too had been regarded one of the World Cup’s standout players, especially after scoring twice against Brazil, before a tentative showing yesterday. In their stead, Boateng made crucial use of his strength and athleticism in the German defence, and Schweinsteiger dictated the game in the middle of the pitch while remaining so astute and committed defensively. He and Ozil were the standouts for Germany in the final.

Meanwhile Muller comes away from the tournament with another five World Cup goals, and Klose scored his sixteenth in total to break Ronaldo’s World Cup goalscoring record. Neuer has brought new acclaim to and a new perspective on the role of goalkeeper with his aggressive and modern sweeping behind the defence. Philipp Lahm scarcely put a foot out of place. Yet Gotze’s magnificent goal encapsulates as well as anything Germany’s World Cup, which has been brilliant at least as much as it has been, at times, workmanlike. After coming so close but falling short at each tournament since 2006, their triumph vindicates Low’s management; and with a winning mentality, the youth of their attackers, and players including Marco Reus and Julian Draxler to come into the side, this may be seen as the beginning rather than the end of an exciting process.

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The Quarter-Finals of Wimbledon and the World Cup

After almost three weeks of football and one week and a half of tennis, competitions have fallen into alignment, and we find ourselves at the quarter-final stage of both Wimbledon and the World Cup. While some of Wimbledon’s ladies have already progressed on into the semi-finals, the gentlemen’s quarter-finals are all scheduled to be played later today, on Centre Court and No. 1 Court; while the World Cup quarter-finals will be played across Friday and Saturday, in Rio de Janeiro, Fortaleza, Brasília, and Salvador.

The draw for the 2014 Wimbledon men’s quarter-finals is as follows:

Novak Djokovic (Serbia) [Seeded 1] (Ranked 2) vs. Marin Cilic (Croatia) [26] (29)

Andy Murray (Great Britain) [3] (5) vs. Grigor Dimitrov (Bulgaria) [11] (13)

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Stan Wawrinka (Switzerland) [5] (3) vs. Roger Federer (Switzerland) [4] (4)

Milos Raonic (Canada) [8] (9) vs. Nick Kyrgios (Australia) (Wild Card) (144)

The 2014 World Cup quarter-finals will see:

France (Current FIFA Ranking 17) vs. Germany (2)

Brazil (3) vs. Colombia (8)

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Argentina (5) vs. Belgium (11)

Netherlands (15) vs. Costa Rica (28)

Now, as I began to put together this post, I hoped to be able to do something remarkable with the two draws: revealing some outstanding coincidence in terms of the rankings or the nationalities involved. Alas, I’m not sure that the details of the two competitions allow this in any meaningful way.

Whereas the Wimbledon singles draws are thoroughly seeded – with thirty-two men and thirty-two women made seeds; with the first round of each draw comprising eight sections, each of which contains one of the top eight seeds; and with each draw being split into top and bottom halves, so that first seed may ultimately meet second seed come the final – the World Cup is seeded foremost at the group stage. Thus last December, when the draw for the World Cup was made, Brazil – the host nation – plus the top seven teams based on FIFA’s World Rankings were made seeds, and placed separately into each of the eight World Cup groups. The eight seeds were Brazil, then Spain, Germany, Argentina, Colombia, Belgium, Uruguay, and Switzerland. The groups are then completed based on geography, so that African, South American, Asian, North American, and European sides are evenly distributed. Following the group stages, group winners go on to meet the runners-up from their adjacent group: the winner of Group A plays the runner-up from Group B, the runner-up from Group A plays the winner of Group B, and so on.

What we can say is that, in both sports, the number one ranked entity going into competition – Rafael Nadal in the tennis, Spain in the football – has been prematurely knocked out. Though seeded only second – and perhaps generously, given that since last reaching the Wimbledon final in 2011, he has fallen in the second round, first round, and fourth round of the tournament – Nadal still went into this Wimbledon ranked number one in the world. Spain – on the back of three tournament successes, winning the European Championships in 2008 and 2012, and winning the last World Cup in 2010 – occupied the same position in the latest FIFA World Rankings. Having lost their first two group matches, Spain gained some meagre consolation by beating Australia 3-0 in their final group game, thereby finishing third in their group. Rafa Nadal at least reached the round of 16, before succumbing yesterday to an Australian, the nineteen-year-old Nick Kyrgios, in the surprise of the tournament so far.

In Djokovic, Wawrinka and Murray, Germany, Brazil and Argentina, both competitions still possess numbers two, three and five in the world rankings of their respective sports. While Switzerland were slightly unfortunate to fall to a 1-0 defeat after extra time last night against Argentina, the nation is strongly represented in the men’s tennis quarter-finals, with Wawrinka vs. Federer arguably the match of the round.

Marin Cilic is in the quarter-finals of Wimbledon for the first time, and after an impressive three-set victory over sixth-seed Tomas Berdych in the third round – incidentally, the latest finish to a match ever on an outside court at the championships, coming to a close at 9.38 pm on No. 3 Court last Friday. However, despite a surge in form since returning to the tour at the beginning of the year – after a four-month suspension for taking the banned supplement nikethamide – Cilic is unlikely to pose Djokovic too many problems. Djokovic has reached the quarter-finals with ease, dropping only one set along the way; coming through in three sets in the last round against a Jo-Wilfried Tsonga who looks increasingly like a spent force at the very top of the game.

Increasingly focused, still building his game, and having both dominated opponents and come through a back-and-forth five-setter against Alexandr Dolgopolov in the third round, Grigor Dimitrov should prove a significantly sterner challenge for Andy Murray, who is yet to drop a set in the tournament. A decisive win for Murray still appears the likely outcome; whereas the two matches making up the lower half of the draw are more difficult to judge. Wawrinka and Federer have never faced one another on grass. While Federer holds a 13-2 lead in the record of their head-to-head encounters, Wawrinka won the last match the two played, in the final of the Monte Carlo Masters in April on clay. Milos Raonic, still only twenty-three, has struggled in the past on grass, and is perhaps less mobile than Kyrgios. Though more than a match for his more inexperienced opponent when it comes to power, Kyrgios – confident and composed after his success over Nadal – would seem in the better position to progress.

The two World Cup quarter-finals which will take place on Friday are highly alluring and hard to call. France and Germany last met at a World Cup in Mexico in 1986, when West Germany progressed to meet Argentina in the final with a 2-0 victory. Both sides laboured through the last round. France beat Nigeria 2-0, with Paul Pogba heading in from a corner with ten minutes remaining, followed by a Joseph Yobo own goal in the second minute of injury time. Having impressed in their opening two matches, scoring eight goals against Honduras and Switzerland, France have lost their fluidity, with Karim Benzema marginalised or simply failing to assert himself to the same degree, and some of their decision making in the final third against Nigeria severely lacking.

Likewise, Germany’s faults and frailties have become increasingly apparent since their 4-0 defeat of Portugal in their opening group game. Two goals in the thirty minutes of extra time on Monday night against an impressive Algeria surely saved Joachim Low from losing the job he has now held for eight years. It is increasingly difficult to view Low as anything more than a poor imitator of other people’s ideas: building on the foundations laid, for better or worse, by Jurgen Klinsmann, Low has in recent years taken indiscriminately from Jurgen Klopp at Borussia Dortmund and from Jupp Heynckes and now Pep Guardiola at Bayern Munich. Moving away from the 4-2-3-1 which has been characteristic of Germany under his leadership, the 4-3-3 which Germany have utilised so far this tournament does not appear to be working from anyone’s perspective. Mirroring Guardiola by playing Philipp Lahm as a defensive midfielder rather than at full-back, the aim is to provide defensive nous and defensive movement in the centre of the pitch. However, Germany’s lack of alternatives at full-back have seen Low field centre-backs across the back four. Against Algeria, a high defensive line exposed a lack of pace in the defence, while even playing high up the pitch, Germany’s converted centre-backs did little to provide width or attacking penetration. For all of his defensive attributes, Lahm would surely offer more to the team playing in his accustomed position.

Playing with a front three, headed by Thomas Muller, rather than with three attacking midfielders behind a central striker or false nine, Germany appear to lack incisive attacking movement. Where Muller and Mesut Ozil used to interchange so effectively and so enticingly behind Miroslav Klose, while Lukas Podolski or Marco Reus added width and directness down the left flank, now Ozil seems a marginal figure and there is less running between the lines and beyond the last line of the opposition defence. Germany may well possess the most talented squad in the tournament, and from 2006 have reached four major semi-finals in a row without managing to go any further. They should be expected to progress against France. The midfield battle, presumably pitting Pogba, Cabaye, and Matuidi against Lahm, Kroos, and Schweinsteiger, will be intriguing to watch, but Germany despite their problems still suggest the more cohesive team, and cherish in Muller a more reliable goalscorer.

Inspired by James Rodriguez and Cuadrado, Colombia have become the chosen side of many neutrals. They have scored eleven goals so far in this World Cup – one goal behind the Netherlands’ tournament-leading twelve – with Rodriguez’s volley against Uruguay the tournament’s most beautiful goal, and they have a fixed and capable defensive unit. Brazil, owing to a lack of talent and to the shortcomings of their defenders, have stocked their central midfield with runners rather than with players who can control the tempo of play, and in the attack they look reliant on Neymar. On form, Colombia should be favourites going into the later kickoff on Friday; they can pose Brazil more problems – with more movement from deep – than Chile, who lost out in the last round by the narrowest of margins.

Both Argentina and Belgium required extra time yesterday to see off Switzerland and the United States. Despite being strongly tipped before the tournament began – Argentina as potential winners, with Lionel Messi expected to shine after an indifferent close to the season with Barcelona; Belgium as everybody’s preferred dark horses owing to the establishment of so many Belgians across Europe, but particularly in the Premier League over the last several years – both sides have stuttered through the competition, winning all of their matches thus far, but always by single-goal margins and without impressive performances to bolster these results. Romelu Lukaku’s legs were the difference for Belgium against a resilient USA; while an excellent run and pass by Messi spurred Argentina to their win. Argentina will go into Saturday’s match as favourites, but only minutely on the back of barely distinguishable form.

As with France and Germany, so too the Netherlands have faltered after enjoying a perfect start to the World Cup, beating reigning champions Spain 5-1. After a close-run victory over Australia and two late goals against Chile, they were two minutes from going out of the competition in the last round against Mexico, before Wesley Sneijder struck and Klaas-Jan Huntelaar converted expertly from a correctly awarded injury-time penalty. Despite Sneijder’s contribution, his first in the tournament; some eye-catching performances from Daley Blind; and the concerted and effective use of Memphis Depay from the substitute’s bench; still the strength of this Dutch side rests heavily on Arjen Robben and Robin van Persie. Robben in particular has been exceptional, proving himself one of the world’s elite players, and with him the Netherlands should have too much for Costa Rica – defensively sound but also lively in the attack in their first two group games, but having to endure an hour with only ten men against Greece before triumphing on penalties.

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Wednesday afternoon update: Beginning earlier than I anticipated after two breezy women’s quarter-finals – which resulted in victories for Eugenie Bouchard and Simona Halep – by the time I published the above piece, the first men’s quarter-finals were already underway. Grigor Dimitrov had just about taken the first set against Andy Murray; and only an hour and forty minutes later, he came away with a comfortable three-set victory, 1-6, 6-7, 2-6, to reach his first Grand Slam semi-final. Meanwhile, Novak Djokovic has just fallen behind against Marin Cilic, down two sets to one as Cilic takes the third set tie-break. As things stand, as far as my predictions or suppositions go, I am also behind, 0-1. Wawrinka leads Federer 3-1 on Centre Court.

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Thursday morning thoughts: Djokovic turned his match round and beat Cilic over five sets, 6-1, 3-6, 6-7, 6-2, 6-2, to prevent another big upset. Federer, already a break down, went on to lose the first set, but he won the next three to progress 6-3, 6-7, 4-6, 4-6. In the last quarter-final of the day, Raonic beat Kyrgios 6-7, 6-2, 6-4, 7-6.

Djokovic had appeared to be progressing serenely through the tournament, steadily building form and momentum, and comfortable in the previous round as he beat Tsonga over three sets. The two sets Cilic took from him yesterday will certainly provide Cilic with much encouragement, his increased aggression paying dividends; but Djokovic seemed to lose impetus after a straightforward first set – something which is becoming characteristic of his game, and so far removed from the player he was a couple of seasons ago. In a similar fashion, but more markedly, Andy Murray’s level has dropped significantly since his return from back surgery, and Dimitrov needed to be strong and steady from the back of the court rather than particularly bold or imaginative yesterday to beat him. Djokovic still has the tools to beat Dimitrov decisively in their semi-final, to be played on Friday: despite his observing to the contrary, it is Djokovic, not Dimitrov, who remains the man to beat: but Dimitrov has grown in stature over the past several months, and has the all-round game to challenge on all surfaces over the long term.

In the Wawrinka vs. Federer match, the tie-break at the end of the second set proved fairly decisive. Wawrinka appeared to be suffering several minor aches and ailments, and called for the doctor at the end of the second set; he still clung on through a particularly tense final game, which saw Federer serving and spurning four match points, and saving a break point before securing the victory. He progresses to his thirty-fifth Grand Slam semi-final.

Faced with Milos Raonic’s serving power and consistency, Nick Kyrgios lacked the same conviction and resoluteness which served him against Rafa Nadal. The match was more one-sided than the scoreline suggests: the statistics show that Raonic won 144 points to Kyrgios’s 111, whereas in his four-set defeat of Nadal, Kyrgios won 144 points to Nadal’s 137. Where Kyrgios had served with an average first-serve speed of 120 mph against Nadal, winning 83% of points on his first serve, against Raonic his average speed dropped to 116%, and he won only 67% of his first-serve points. Raonic meanwhile hit 39 aces to Kyrgios’s 15; his average first-serve speed was at 121 mph, and he won 88% of points on his first serve; even his second serve kept an average speed of 107 mph. Raonic returned effectively, hit more than double Kyrgios’s winners from the back of the court, and also came to the net frequently, winning points at the net more often than not. He will pose Federer a different sort of challenge: one that appears even somewhat old fashioned, built around a big serve, eschewing the long rallying which has dominated men’s tennis over the last five or six years; but carried out with the sort of precision which Raonic showed against Kyrgios, it is a style of play which is supremely difficult to beat.

A Recapitulation of England’s Failings at the World Cup

So England are home and safe, out of the World Cup effectively after their second game, lingering only for a 0-0 draw against Costa Rica last Tuesday in a dead rubber match for both sides. In the midst of arguments that England’s players simply aren’t good enough, that the squad was too inexperienced this time round but will have gained for the future, or that – as Wayne Rooney hopelessly and absurdly suggested, echoed several days later by Alan Shearer – England are ‘too honest’ to succeed, there has been some talk of formations. Gary Lineker stressed before the tournament began that he didn’t want to see England playing with flat lines; but while the 4-2-3-1 formation which Roy Hodgson has consistently utilised as England manager appears removed from a traditional 4-4-2, Lineker concluded on England’s departure from Brazil that their 4-2-3-1 in fact offered little different:

‘The system that suits this kind of England better, with the lack of experience in it, is probably a 4-3-3 […] The problem with this 4-2-3-1 is that it very quickly becomes a 4-4-2 or at least a 4-4-1-1 and we end up with flat lines and people getting between us. I think we would have been better – and I said this before the tournament – with three midfield players because you’ve got to give yourself a chance defensively.’

The 4-3-3 and the 4-2-3-1 can be so closely related that the two formations become indistinguishable, or they can be decidedly distinct, depending on structure and personnel. Broadly, there are two ways of setting up a 4-3-3: with the midfield three in an upright triangle, where one midfielder adopts a more attacking role ahead of the other two; or with the midfielders in an inverted triangle, with one deeper player behind two more advanced, and often more mobile counterparts. If the triangle points forward, then the formation begins to resemble a 4-2-3-1. The difference remains in the distance between the more attacking midfield player and the lone striker, and in the position of the two wide players. In a 4-3-3, the two wide attackers typically play high up the pitch, usually stretching wide, often cutting inside to interchange with the striker and to provide a goalscoring threat. In a 4-2-3-1, the two wide attackers may occupy wide positions, but they may also play more narrowly, the three advanced midfielders even changing places through the course of the game so that each spends time in the centre of the pitch. The 4-2-3-1 therefore offers a degree of flexibility in so far as the wide attackers may be wingers, but they may also be advanced playmakers whose skills lie in passing and creating rather than dribbling and providing an incisive threat in the opposition penalty box.

Of course, if both wide attackers in a 4-2-3-1 function more as playmakers than as wingers, then the onus falls on the full-backs to provide width. If the two wide players are laden with defensive responsibilities, the 4-2-3-1 essentially becomes a 4-4-1-1, and not vastly different from a 4-4-2. On the other hand, an oft-stated problem with the 4-2-3-1 is that it can cause a schism between defence and attack, with the four attacking players concerned only with attacking duties, and the six players behind them sitting to defend.

There are several cases for England playing a 4-2-3-1. Many of their attacking players would seem better suited to the formation. Of Raheem Sterling, Adam Lallana, Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain, and James Milner, only Sterling, with his pace and attacking instinct, is a natural playing high and wide in a 4-3-3. While Danny Welbeck clearly sees himself as a striker – and has many of the qualities which tend to make for a useful lone forward – when he is used as a wide player for both England and Manchester United, it is primarily for his ball-winning capabilities, which require him playing in a deeper role. And if Wayne Rooney is not playing up top or centrally behind a striker, he too seems more of a 4-2-3-1 player, happier playmaking and running from a deeper position than he is stretching the play out wide.

At the same time, England’s lack of quality in the central midfield positions is only exacerbated by playing a 4-2-3-1. Together, Steven Gerrard and Jordan Henderson possessed neither the ability nor the athleticism to excel in a demanding role. Perhaps Jack Wilshere could have offered more alongside Henderson – a better combination of tactical nous and running – but England didn’t have many options for the two deeper midfield positions, with Frank Lampard, like Gerrard, having made his career essentially as an attacking player and now old and slow; with James Milner lacking defensive astuteness; and with Ross Barkley excelling for Everton last season playing in an advanced role in a 4-2-3-1, largely free of defensive work, and where misplaced passes are of less consequence. A triangle, with Gerrard sitting deep as he did last season for Liverpool, or a staggered midfield three, even of Wilshere, Henderson and Barkley, would have afforded England more flexibility and more solidity in the centre of the pitch. As Lineker pointed out, the 4-2-3-1 at least functioned more effectively against Italy, where Sterling occupied the central position behind Daniel Sturridge instead of Rooney: whether by trait or inclination, Sterling proved more capable of interlinking with and supporting the two deeper midfielders and connecting England’s play.

The focus on Wayne Rooney in the build up to and during the World Cup was based less on an unhealthy ‘obsession’ or ‘fixation’, as Roy Hodgson and Frank Lampard in turn claimed, but on a foundation of genuine and rational concern. Rooney has failed to impress at an international tournament since 2004; and there is a sense that he doesn’t have an obvious place in the current England setup. This is against an implicit background which has seen England waste a decade of international football trying to shoehorn supposed superstars – Gerrard and Lampard – into first elevens that repeatedly would not function. At club level, Rooney has been marginalised over the last two seasons by Robin van Persie, a better target-man owing to his ability to hold the ball and bring others into play with his back to goal, and a better finisher. For England, Daniel Sturridge headed to Brazil on the back of an excellent season for Liverpool, confident and with his pace a key asset. Rooney did not warrant a striking role ahead of Sturridge; England had better options than an unwilling Rooney out wide; and playing behind the striker, again, Rooney offered too little support to the midfielders behind him. As things stand, he may be England’s most capable all-round footballer, and the second or third best option for a variety of positions, but England ought to try building a team in which Rooney is only an incidental part.

The average age of the England squad was 26.1 years old. In relation to other World Cup squads, Argentina’s was the oldest, with an average age of 28.5, followed by Portugal’s at 28.2, and Uruguay, Greece and Honduras’s each at 28.1. Ghana’s average age of 24.9 was the youngest in the competition, followed by Nigeria (25.3), Belgium (25.5), Switzerland (25.6), and South Korea (25.7). In Group D, aside from Uruguay’s 28.1, the average age of Italy’s squad was 27.4, with CostaRica’s coming in at 27.1. England’s squad, then, was the youngest in their group and towards the younger end of the spectrum in the World Cup: their squad was the ninth youngest overall of the thirty-two competing nations, just older than Germany’s and the Netherlands’, just younger than Algeria’s and Cameroon’s. On the pitch, the gap narrowed: England’s first eleven against Italy and Uruguay had an average age of 26.9 versus average ages of 27.7 and 27.1 respectively; while against Costa Rica, England’s revamped eleven had an average age of 25.4, against Costa Rica’s average age of 26.2 (it is worth pointing out that Costa Rica played largely the same side against England as they had played against Italy and Uruguay, making only two changes, which reduced the average age of their eleven marginally from 26.4).

So England’s squad and its first eleven was young but not exceptionally so. The idea that a young squad will benefit and eventually flourish from this World Cup experience only holds true, of course, provided the same players continue to be picked and provided that they continue to improve and show that they are talented enough for the top level. Raheem Sterling stood out against Italy playing centrally, and would seem to offer the most potential as well as the most possibilities for England even if his immediate future is as a right-sided attacker. Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain impressed in the warm-up game against Ecuador before injury limited his involvement in the tournament, and he provides strength and dribbling ability through the midfield. Daniel Sturridge is an accomplished striker, a good finisher with quick and intelligent movement, and still only twenty-four years old. Danny Welbeck emerges from the World Cup with his reputation surely enhanced after linking well with Sterling and Sturridge against Italy, but his productivity will continue to be questioned as long as he plays away from his preferred position. Ross Barkley and Luke Shaw had strong seasons for their clubs, and will look to build on these for club and country. Adam Lallana is twenty-six, and suggests a later-bloomer, although he has been a mainstay of the Southampton side since turning twenty. While Shaw is set for a big-money move to Manchester United based on solid performances and perceived potential, Lallana had an excellent season for Southampton last year, but may move to Liverpool primarily to afford them with seamless options rather than to improve their starting team.

Of greater concern is England’s defence. Apart from Shaw, there are hopes that Jon Flanagan will continue to prosper for Liverpool and establish himself as a viable option at full-back. Everton’s John Stones was the other defender on World Cup standby; Kieran Gibbs and Steven Caulker are both struggling for a proper opportunity at international level; but of those with some international experience, neither Phil Jones nor Chris Smalling appear sensible long-term prospects, and clearly aren’t being routinely picked based on their decidedly meagre talents. With Phil Jagielka and Gary Cahill a mediocre centre-back pairing, England may struggle over the next few years for a strong and settled defence.

In addition to insightful tactical analysis, Lineker offered an interesting observation regarding a lack of leadership in the England team. This didn’t amount to an assertion that there are too few talkers in the side; instead, Lineker suggested England lack the footballing brains required to ‘spot problems on the pitch’. Singling out Gerrard – who ‘has always been an individual in many ways. He’s not really a player that can organise or spot problems’ – Lineker was clear that the England squad as a collective is without players who can identify issues and implement changes amid the flow and thrust of a game. It is tempting to think that Roy Hodgson too, by virtue of age and ability, is not the man to lead and nurture a group of young players towards a bright future.

Hodgson is a peculiarity in so far as he is routinely described as ‘likeable’ despite being cantankerous and banal whenever he appears in front of the press. He admitted that he encouraged Gerrard to address the squad prior to the second group game against Uruguay, accepting that Gerrard is ‘very good at saying in two or three sentences what takes me 10 minutes to talk through’. Gerrard’s pronouncing was, by his own confession, intended to strike fear into the other players, forcing them to ‘realise it could be a terrible, long, frustrating summer if we don’t get it right on Thursday’. Whether Gerrard’s words were wise, whether he possesses the stature and the intelligence to fulfil the role to which Hodgson appointed him, even more bizarre was Hodgson’s palpable pleasure after the 0-0 draw against Costa Rica, upon which he exclaimed ‘I’m pleased to have given the fans something to cheer’. It is marked that Cesare Prandelli, ten years younger than Hodgson and with as many selection difficulties – inheriting in 2010 a squad from which Fabio Cannavaro, Gianluca Zambrotta, and Gennaro Gattuso  had just retired, which was in the process of saying long goodbyes to Alessandro del Piero and Francesco Totti, and with Andrea Pirlo towards the latter stages of his career – immediately tendered his resignation upon Italy’s failure to qualify from the group.

Elsewhere the trite and troubling assertion that too many foreigners are to blame emerged via Gerrard and Paul Scholes (a more independent and thoughtful pundit than there was any justification to expect; though it must be remembered that on the football pitch, memory of Scholes’s violent lunges at opponents make Luis Suarez appear, by way of comparison, a veritable saint). It is worth asking whether we really desire a situation whereby English players, already possessing such economic and infrastructural advantages over so many other youngsters, are afforded positive discrimination to ensure for them a place in the Premier League. While it seems virtuous to encourage Premier League managers to give opportunities to their young players, to enforce that opportunities must be given to Englishmen seems to accept a fundamental financial problem within the game – which English clubs and English players have impelled and exacerbated much more than most – or to admit that English youngsters are lacking in talent and work ethic.

If the latter is the case, then the standard of football coaching at all levels in England must again come under scrutiny. Sitting alongside Shearer and Lineker as they gave their final thoughts on England’s campaign, Chris Waddle afforded precisely this scrutiny. Waddle was, incidentally, along with Lineker and John Barnes, one of the figures who instigated the change of formation, from a 4-4-2 to a 5-3-2, which propelled England to the semi-finals of Italia 90 – a process recounted in Pete Davies’  All Played Out. While coaching problems entwine with broader cultural problems within the English game – which result in the refusal by English players to consider their options abroad – it may be wondered whether, instead of fewer foreign players, more foreign coaches could usefully invigorate youth coaching and football throughout the lower tiers.

The Premier League Now: Newcastle’s Plight, the Advantage Rule, and the Apotheosis of Ryan Giggs

Newcastle’s Plight? Pardew’s Shite!

Newcastle were roundly defeated at the Emirates Stadium on Monday night, 3-0 by an Arsenal side who roamed about the pitch without much impetus, but scrapped decisively in the opposition penalty area, and could ultimately have scored twice as many goals with only a little extra effort. Two points behind Everton with five games of the season remaining, and with Champions League qualification out of their hands, Arsenal are now four points ahead of their rivals and would guarantee fourth place with a win in one of their final two games. That and a victory in the FA Cup final against Hull would mark a pretty good season for the proverbial ‘Gunners’, who are only if habitually two or three players away from an exciting squad able to challenge on all fronts.

Meanwhile Newcastle can look back to 29 December, when they last played Arsenal, and will see that across 18 league games since then – precisely half of their season – they have won 4 games, drawn 1, and lost 13. They have failed to score in 13 of those games, and they have conceded 34 goals. 7 of those defeats have come at St James’ Park, including 0-3 defeats against their local rivals Sunderland and against Everton, and 0-4 defeats versus Tottenham Hotspur and Manchester United. After six defeats in a row, the club is on its worst run for 27 years; over those six games, the statistics read 1 goal scored, with 17 goals conceded.

Many of the players have given up, and some have looked tired for several months now, but it has long since been time to recognise Alan Pardew’s absolute failure as a football manager. The statistics alone do not reflect quite how badly Newcastle play: they do not quite manage to convey the utter lack of defensive shape, composure and application, and the total absence of attacking intent. To the press, Pardew often proclaims himself an advocate of proactive, passing football. In his moments of private honesty, he probably thinks of himself as tactically astute, capable of setting up teams to be defensively solid, retaining their shape, and effective on the counter-attack. His coaching staff have previously admitted that, under his guidance, they spend 80% of their week on defensive coaching.

The notion that Pardew possesses any attacking instinct is an absurdity thoroughly disproved across his three-and-a-half years as Newcastle’s manager. He has singularly failed to impose anything resembling an attacking philosophy upon the team. His side play too many long balls; but they aren’t consistently directed, the club does not possess a target-man, and there appears no endeavour towards the midfielders breaking forward to seize on half-won chances. Newcastle have too few wide players; but Pardew prefers anyway to shunt central players out wide and to utilise them, essentially, as defenders, covering a lot of ground and supporting in the central areas and at full-back. The possibility of passing football is negated at the outset because – to the extent that they are coached at all as a unit – the attacking players do not appear to be coached to pass and move, or to move with any pace and ingenuity off the ball.

Pardew’s attacking modus has been to simply rely on his forwards conjuring enough goals, hoping that his side will thereby scrape enough points for barely respectable league finishes. He has been fortunate in that Demba Ba, briefly Papiss Cisse, and now Loic Rémy have provided precisely this – but Ba, an effective yet cheap solution in the summer after Andy Carroll had been sold for £35 million, left for Chelsea a year and a half  later for just £7 million, one of many instances whereby the club’s penny-pinching has in fact cost it considerable income; Cisse has been abysmal for two seasons now; and Rémy is on loan, and unlikely to sign for a club who will match neither his ambition, nor his transfer fee, nor his wages.

What limited success Pardew has achieved at Newcastle has been built on defensive solidity. That success amounts to the 2011-12 season, where Newcastle finished fifth, but only dominated teams and played good football during a spell towards the season’s close, progressing into a 4-3-3 system which was uncomfortably tossed aside at the start of the following campaign; and to the first half of this season, where Newcastle hit upon a strong run of form, impelled by the goalscoring of Rémy and the drive and creativity of Yohan Cabaye, then sold to Paris Saint-Germain. Yet this defensive solidity has always proven frail, incapable of being maintained and susceptible to minor shocks. Pardew is frequently shocked by that which everyone else sees coming, and he is incapable of adapting to meet changing requirements. Newcastle have lost 20 games by three goals or more under his stewardship (twice losing by three goals to Sunderland); and have let in three goals or more on 31 occasions in total.

Impotent when it comes to the attack, managing only a defence which stutters at best, but is now conceding goals at an alarming rate, what is it that Pardew does do? The answer is that he does, in effect, nothing; which is to say he does the same worthless things over and over again, without any care, sensibility or intelligence. His substitutions are throwaway gestures, by rote rather than responding to what is happening on the pitch. Recent absurdities have seen Shola Ameobi brought on with mere seconds to play against Everton and Manchester United, with the side already losing 0-3. The Newcastle fans do not regard Shola’s appearance as a treat which makes the previous ninety minutes of failure worthwhile. Hatem Ben Arfa, rarely allowed to start a game, has made frequent appearances from the bench after sixty minutes of games which are already lost; but his deteriorating relationship with Pardew has now robbed the team and the support entirely of the club’s most talented, most exciting, and only creative attacking player.

Off the pitch the fans are treated with the same contempt. Pardew – always quick to aggrandise himself when things are going well – resorts to platitudes about effort, about luck, about things ‘just not going for us’, while seeking to blame others for his own evils. The national media are typically compliant. The club admits to being disinterested in cup success; while this summer may see the culmination of years of mismanagement of the playing staff. With Loic Rémy to return to Queens Park Rangers before moving on to a bigger club, and with Newcastle’s other loan forward, Luuk de Jong, flat-footed and lacking in vigour, Newcastle will be without a strikeforce; and already require a replacement for Yohan Cabaye and reinforcements out wide. But more, it is difficult to see some of Newcastle’s better talents – Tim Krul, Mathieu Debuchy, Fabricio Coloccini, and Ben Arfa – remaining with the club. The squad will require, but is unlikely to receive, profound and astute investment. A club with Newcastle’s long and short term history, but more a support which continues to provide over 50,000 people at home games – the third best attendance in the country and one of the best in the world – has plenty of reason to expect better.

The Advantage Rule: Phil Dowd Makes a Pertinent Suggestion

One of the most controversial decisions affecting last weekend’s fixtures concerned the match between Sunderland and Cardiff.  On the stroke of half-time, Phil Dowd chose to award Connor Wickham a penalty, and sent off Juan Cala for pulling him back – only after first allowing Wickham to play on, rounding the keeper and playing the ball across goal, where it was cleared by Cardiff’s defenders. Sunderland’s manager Gus Poyet called the decision to then bring play back the ‘best decision I have seen in my life’; a sentiment broadly echoed by Match of the Day pundits Alan Shearer and Mark Lawrenson. Elsewhere the decision provoked some consternation, both among those who felt that Cala’s foul had taken place outside of the penalty area, and from those who were unused to or disagreed with such a lengthy interpretation of the advantage rule.

The raw essence of the advantage rule in football is easy to grasp, because its nature is explicated by virtue of its name. According to FIFA, the rule ‘allows play to continue when the team against which an offence has been committed will benefit from such an advantage’. That is, according to the rule, upon an infringement, play will be allowed to continue where it may conceivably advantage the non-offending team. Practically, this will usually refer to a team on the attack; but it is possible that an advantage may be played in a transitional moment, where an attacking player commits an offence amid the process of losing the ball, allowing the defending team to seize possession and launch a counter, turning defence into attack. Where there is no possibility for attack there can be no reasonable advantage from play continuing.

In practise, the rule is often ignored or misused. The most flagrant misuse of the rule seems to stem from an ill-conceived, incoherent notion of the very word ‘advantage’. Often when referees indicate that they are playing an advantage – negating their whistle, thrusting both arms in front of them, and continuing to run, often exaggeratedly and with renewed haste, as if to emphasise there will be no pause to proceedings – they are not actually offering an advantage to the non-offending team. Rather, they are simply allowing the game to flow; or worse, they are avoiding having to make a decision. A flowing game may be for the broad benefit of the general viewer, but the rule does not call for a flowing game. If an attacking player is fouled in the process of making a pass, and his teammate still receives the ball, advantage should only be played if that teammate finds himself in an opportune attacking position. If instead he finds himself isolated, without another teammate to pass to, his attacking partner on the floor instead of on the run and available for a return ball, then play should stop and a free-kick ought to be given. In the same vein, if an attacking player is pulled back or has to hurdle a wild challenge, and he remains in possession, but has lost his attacking impetus – slowed, and closed down by other defenders – then he is gaining no sensible advantage by the referee waving play forward.

Again, sometimes the rule is misused by referees who would abdicate their responsibilities. As FIFA’s ruling states, the referee ‘penalises the original offence if the anticipated advantage does not ensue at that time’, and he ‘takes disciplinary action against players guilty of cautionable and sending-off offences. He is not obliged to take this action immediately but must do so when the ball next goes out of play’. Often, however, referees will indicate an advantage as a means of ignoring an incident: where they are unsure if a foul has been committed, or where calling a foul would be problematic – perhaps owing to its practitioner already being on a booking – they will often indicate an advantage without calling play back where necessary, and without taking any action at the next stoppage. The rule is thus used to gloss over incidents with which referees would rather not trouble.

Aside from misuses and misinterpretations, there are other uncertainties regarding rule’s application. FIFA’s guidelines are not unambiguous: they call for referees to take into account, when applying the rule, ‘the atmosphere of the match’, as though a hostile crowd or an agitated set of players should imbue a certain degree of caution; and they seem to imply that it may be preferable to deal with serious fouls immediately, punishing cautionable offences without first affording the non-offending team an advantage. FIFA’s rules consider ‘the severity of the offence. If the infringement warrants an expulsion, the referee shall stop play and send the player off unless there is a subsequent opportunity to score a goal’. It is not clear why – cases of injury aside – the criteria for advantage should be stricter the more severe the offence.

Beyond these concerns, it seems that the rule can be applied, properly and with the right motivations, in two subtly distinct ways. The first is reactive, and the second proactive; the first merely utilises the rule in immediate response to events on the pitch, whereas the second would impress the rule in such a way so as to encourage future behaviour. The demarcator between these approaches is the length of time a referee is willing to allow before calling play back. If a referee is willing to allow only a couple of seconds, then his decision making has to be quick and, to an extent, speculative: he has to determine almost instantly whether the non-offending team is in a position to gain an advantage, accepting that he will not always get this decision right. Phil Dowd on Sunday demonstrated a different approach, allowing play to run on for longer, and being willing to call it back once it had broken down.

The great benefit of the second approach is that it is proactive in encouraging players to stay on their feet, and to make the best of their own abilities. If players understand they can make the effort to stay upright, can attempt a dribble, a pass, or a shot, while knowing that they will still receive a free-kick should they be tackled or their pass or shot immediately blocked, then this will surely reduce the numbers who go to ground easily or effectively dive anticipating contact. If players understand instead that the decision to play advantage is more or less final, and that play won’t be called back after more than a second or two, they will remain inclined to go to ground for the relative surety of a free-kick.

The issue becomes one of delineating advantage so that it properly allows for and encourages good attacking play; without offering attackers too much of an advantage, to the point where they effectively receive two bites at an overly-ripened cherry. It becomes inappropriate, for instance, for an attacker to force an excellent save from a goalkeeper, only for that goalkeeper to then have to face a free-kick from a dangerous position once play has been called back for a foul much earlier in the build-up. Phil Dowd got the decision on Sunday right, and used the advantage rule in a way which should suggest its future application – though it is worth noting that his decision was made easier precisely because a penalty kick was at stake. If Wickham had been pulled back ten yards further out, and had still rounded the keeper but failed to score, should the play then have been brought back for a free-kick?

The Apotheosis of Ryan Giggs

After the jubilation that met his appointment as Manchester United’s interim manager, Ryan Giggs vindicated utterly, once and for all and remarkably, the impassioned belief all in football have in him as he led Manchester United to a groundbreaking, new-era-defining 4-0 home victory over Norwich City – who are, incidentally, a club in the relegation zone and with six defeats in their last seven games.

David Moyes was a ridiculous figure at Manchester United, blundering from the very start of his reign: fumbling in the transfer market before overpaying for Marouane Fellaini; making uneasy remarks about fixture list corruption in an ill-considered attempt to ape Alex Ferguson; then acceding to Wayne Rooney’s every demand in tying him to a new contract. Still, the media’s response to him and to his departure has been in every way unpalatable: from their early forwarding of him as a reasonable candidate for the post of Manchester United manager; to their perseverance in his favour when foreign managers, such as André Villas-Boas, have been hounded out of clubs for doing much better work; to their bizarre and unwarranted sense of vindication and self-congratulation upon his sacking; to their celebration of Ryan Giggs as the rightful heir to Ferguson’s clammy throne. In the aftermath to Saturday’s game, the BBC’s UK website pushed United’s 4-0 win over Norwich as the third biggest story in world news; and for a couple of days ran as the second headline of their sports page with a vacuous article relating how Anders Lindegaard – the brazenly meaningless Manchester United reserve goalkeeper – has decided within a week that Ryan Giggs resembles, as a manager, Pep Guardiola, under whom Lindegaard has never played.

It ought to be remembered that, aside from being an adulterer, a bully and an abuser of the courts, Ryan Giggs has been one of the worst cheats the game of football has seen over the last twenty years. He had it all, in so far as he would dive, make cynical challenges, but most of all routinely lead the charge of Manchester United players as they surrounded, harangued and abused referees. Now not only he, but his partners in crime, Paul Scholes and Nicky Butt, have all been embraced as great coaches – regardless of the fact that they have never coached.

I recall Scholes and Butt as dullards: Scholes a thug who would lunge recklessly at opponents game after game without censure; Butt one of the worst players I have seen in a Newcastle shirt, always shirking responsibility on the ball, whether aimlessly chipping it forward or hammering it into his teammates’ shins. It would be remarkable that the players appear to be embracing Giggs and company; but Ferguson’s twenty years of success at United showed the virtue of an eminently stupid playing staff, who will buy into your siege mentality in spite of all the material odds, and invariably the referees too, being in your favour. For those of us who despise and would like to go on despising Manchester United, the prospect of the likeable Louis van Gaal’s appointment is eminently less enticing than Ryan Giggs continuing, and hopefully failing miserably, in the role.

Additional Thoughts: Brendan Rodgers, the Relegation Battle, José Mourinho and Champions League Defeat

• Many are too quick to dismiss the notion that success in football may be ‘deserved’ independent of actual outcomes. While there is much to dislike about the club, its supporters, and its overwhelming presence in the media via a horde of inane former-players-turned-banalysts, still Brendan Rodgers has done a magnificent job across two years as Liverpool’s manager, and his team do deserve the Premier League title based upon their achievements to this point and their enticing, entertaining style of play.

Though not all of his acquisitions have proven successful, the signings of Daniel Sturridge and Philippe Coutinho in January 2013 turned Liverpool around, and represented significant vision and risk-taking: it was far from clear that Liverpool required two physically slight, quick, and versatile forwards to partner Luis Suárez, at a time when many thought they needed instead a central striker off whom Suárez could play. This season, Rodgers has also drawn a lot out of Jordan Henderson, while encouraging Stephen Gerrard to (mostly) thrive playing a deeper role. Manchester City may still beat Liverpool to the title, and they have also shown themselves capable of superb attacking football – and in Manuel Pellegrini have one of the most engaging and dignified managers about – but they have also been exceedingly fortunate with some refereeing decisions in several close games.

• There is little between those teams from 20th up to Swansea and Hull in 12th and 13th; and arguably, in quality if not in points, all the way up to Newcastle who lie currently in 9th. Pepe Mel deserves a lot of credit for West Brom’s recent run of form; while an awful couple of months at West Ham have put Sam Allardyce increasingly under pressure. Both sides should be safe; with Aston Villa thereabouts. Norwich would seem destined for relegation given their two final games are against Chelsea and Arsenal; Sunderland have some momentum, but both they and Fulham may fancy their chances with two winnable fixtures remaining apiece.

• José Mourinho, obliged by the English media, has sought to identify a solid but unspectacular save by Thibaut Courtois – Atlético Madrid’s goalkeeper, on loan from Chelsea – as the decisive moment in Chelsea’s 1-3 Champions League semi-final defeat. So Mourinho and the English media continue a mutually beneficial but vapid and self-absorbed relationship: one which here seeks to assert English football as the centre of the known world, after a night during which Sky’s commentators repeatedly linked Diego Simeone and other successful Champions League managers to a relatively unappealing, unfulfilling, and irrelevant post which would restore Manchester United to the top of the sport.

Chelsea’s defeat was not, in sum, the product of one player who they happen to own anyway. It was the result of them being thoroughly outclassed by a much better side, stronger in defence, more courageous and clinical in attack, and superior at keeping hold of the football. José Mourinho’s manner on and off the pitch demands constant success in terms of trophies, and as Chelsea appear to have attained none this season, his first year back at the club can be considered nothing but a failure.

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FIFA’s guidelines governing the advantage rule: http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/afdeveloping/refereeing/law_5_the_referee_en_47411.pdf

Joe Kinnear, Derek Llambias, and Tragicomedy at Newcastle

After he announced it solo on Sunday, and proclaimed it loudly and proudly to the incredulity and horror of the support, it was not until yesterday that – just before lunchtime – Newcastle United Football Club deigned to confirm Joe Kinnear as their new Director of Football. The responsibility was belatedly taken up by Managing Director Derek Llambias – the morning after Kinnear repeatedly got his name wrong during a remarkable and ridiculous interview with Talksport. Calling Llambias ‘Lambazey’, Kinnear also mispronounced many of Newcastle’s first-team: Hatem Ben Arfa became Ben Afra then Ben Afry; Yohan Cabaye was referred to as Cabard; Jonás Gutíerrez was called Goaltierrez – sharply ironic given his lack of goals, and Kinnear’s later lament over the midfield’s general insufficiency in this department; Shola Ameobi was dubbed Amamobi; and Papiss Cissé given the unflattering ‘Sissy’.

This was amidst a profusion of blatant lies regarding Kinnear’s own history: taking in everything from the number of times he has been awarded Manager of the Year (he claims thrice, but the truth raises a single finger); his purchases and player sales while at Wimbledon; the procurement of goalkeeper Tim Krul (who Kinnear claims he signed, but who actually arrived at the club a whole three years previously); and his record when manager of Newcastle, which he argues was stellar, but which amounted to five victories across twenty-six games, one of the worst managerial tenures the club has ever witnessed.

Adding complexity to a situation already difficult to comprehend, this morning saw the announcement of the resignation of the same ‘Lambazey’ who so recently heralded Kinnear’s arrival. Thus Newcastle find themselves without a Managing Director. Llambias has been responsible for the financial side of the club, working on their accounts, transfer dealings, player contracts, and sponsorship arrangements. Moving to Newcastle during his time in the job, he has been the central boardroom figure on a day-to-day basis, with Mike Ashley based in London and preoccupied with his other concerns; and it has been Llambias’s role to release statements to the press, whenever the board have felt themselves so inclined.

Through the murk cast by Llambias’s resignation, Mike Ashley’s appointment of Kinnear still seems brazenly and typically contemptuous. If it is taken at face value, do Newcastle need a Director of Football, and is Kinnear in any fathomable way an appropriate man for the job?

The role of Director of Football is one that can and does work successfully; but it is a role that has to be properly defined, and whose remit must reflect the stature and the aims of the employing club. Sporting Directors are the rule rather than the exception in Italy and much of Spain; but while the two job titles are often considered equivalent or at least analogous when the debate regarding Directors of Football is held in England, Sporting Directors tend to work more strictly on the financial side of the game, with regard to player purchases, contracts, sponsorship deals, and their club’s media image and media rights. Directors of Football in England are often positioned as more intermediary figures, ‘football people’ rather than possessing any particular financial acumen, who straddle some line between the manager and the board.

With Directors of Football in England having this foot in both camps, usually being ex-footballers, and often having had previous stints in management, the managers they work above regard them with suspicion and readily feel undermined, while the Directors of Football themselves are inclined to meddle. Without being delimited to financial dealings, the go-between role they are supposed to inhabit seems too broad and breeds confusion and uncertainty.

Where Sporting Directors have achieved particular acclaim for providing stability, it has frequently been for moderately-sized clubs where a high turnover of players and coaches is expected. Clubs like Sevilla and Getafe have achieved relative success with Sporting Directors who embrace a model of their clubs as stepping stones: scouting players and coaches who routinely move on for bigger fees, and are then replaced at low cost, Sporting Directors become the only fixtures at clubs in flux yet consistently achieving slightly beyond their means. If such a turnover isn’t expected or accepted, if Sporting Directors are prominent but don’t come with success on the pitch, then they can be held just as accountable for a club’s failings as managers are, and can become equally the recipients of supporters’ vitriol. The potential for this scenario is exacerbated given the typically higher profile, more wide-ranging but less well-defined nature of Directors of Football.

Newcastle under the ownership of Mike Ashley have suffered under a Director of Football before. Kevin Keegan was so thoroughly undermined by Dennis Wise’s occupancy of the position that he left the club after eight months in September 2008; Kinnear’s appointment in his place helping steer the club towards relegation. For many Newcastle fans, any semblance that the club was being run with dignity died upon Keegan’s resignation and in its aftermath. The club were forced to pay out £2 million after a tribunal ruled that Keegan had been misled by Wise, Llambias and Ashley; who were forced to admit they had lied to the club’s supporters regarding transfer targets and the structure they had forced into place.

I was born in 1986, and recall attending my first football matches before and during the 1992-93 promotion season (my first match was a pre-season friendly away versus York City). Kevin Keegan replaced Ossie Ardiles as Newcastle’s manager in February 1992; and seven victories in the final sixteen games of the season (with a team which had won only six times in their previous thirty league games) saw Newcastle beat relegation to the third tier, which would have been a first in the club’s history. Newcastle won the league the next season and were promoted to the Premiership. When Keegan had arrived, St James’ Park was open in the corners and the club shop was a portacabin in the stadium car-park; owing to him, the stadium’s corners were filled in, the capacity grew first to 36,000 then to 52,000, and after coming so close to the league title in 1995-96 the club were firmly established among the country’s elite. In 2012-13, the club still managed the tenth highest average attendance figure in European football. The facilities and the support are there for the club to be great, to achieve and to spend with the biggest in the world; Mike Ashley is an abject failure with regard to the club’s commercial performance, as well as regarding those performances which culminate on the pitch.

The job title given to Joe Kinnear, the brief description of his role contained within the club’s statement confirming his appointment, and Kinnear’s character and his own pronouncements, all suggest a Director of Football of the type who will be proactive on the footballing side, with regard to the club’s manager, Alan Pardew, and its first-team. Yet Kinnear’s last permanent position in football ended almost nine years ago, when he was sacked as manager of Nottingham Forest as they fell towards the third tier (a sacking which he tends to forget). His four months managing Newcastle on a temporary contract in 2008-09 marks his only subsequent involvement within the game. He would not appear to possess the knowledge or recent experience required of an effective Director of Football. While he has been full of praise for his own tactical nous, tactics should presumably remain the realm of the club’s manager; and the type of football Kinnear is known for is not one which would be appreciated by Newcastle fans. His ability to alienate and upset players, his proclivity towards self-aggrandizement, his diarrhetic dealings with the press, make him singularly ill-suited to a stabilising, advisory role. Any liaising through Kinnear between Pardew, Chief Scout Graham Carr, and the board, will amount, at best, to putting a phrase many times through Google translate with a filter set to ‘Swear’.

Llambias’s resignation raises the possibility that Kinnear is set to take on at least some of his previous responsibilities. Some – treating Kinnear’s re-appearance with a sincerity it barely deserves, and desperately groping for some positive reading – have suggested that, if far from ideal, Kinnear – as a footballing man – represents something of a step in the right direction, the emergence of a footballing perspective at boardroom level. Still, without any apparent financial expertise and given his impetuous personality, it is difficult to see and impossible to desire Kinnear working closely on the club’s finances. Does this mean that a new Managing Director will be appointed; or that Mike Ashley will become more active in the club’s affairs? Presuming someone is tasked with the financial side of the club, Kinnear will take on only those duties relating to the press for which he is angrily incompetent; adding a significant layer of outspoken ill-judgement before matters reach the advanced stage of financial negotiation.

All this carelessly assumes that Kinnear has genuinely been appointed to serve a real purpose, to fulfill sensibly and successfully a legitimate role. He may have been appointed solely out of spite, to aggravate a support which turned on Mike Ashley after the betrayal of Keegan. Indeed, since then, Ashley’s attitude to the club has been invariably insulting and dismissive: cycling through various nonsensical plans and several managers, the general policy has been not to develop the club, but to keep things ticking over at minimal cost, communicating as little as possible, upsetting the fans often, presumably waiting in the hope of recouping his costs. That this is a decision meant to upset is further indicated by the timing of yesterday’s announcement: it is as though Kinnear had to prove his incompetence to a nationwide audience before his appointment was confirmed.

On the other hand, perhaps Kinnear has returned as something of a stop-gap, with Llambias’s departure in mind. There were rumours last season of a falling out between Ashley and Llambias, and Kinnear’s appearance and Llambias’s disappearance are surely connected. With a different title and in a different position, perhaps Kinnear’s essential purpose will be to report directly to Ashley regarding club goings-on, strictly and devotedly however incompetently.

It has been speculated that the confirmation of Kinnear’s arrival was delayed because Pardew refused to provide a statement of support for his new superior. It is possible that Ashley hopes, by appointing Kinnear, to force Pardew from his role – hoping to essentially humiliate him into resigning. Neither Llambias nor Pardew seem to excel when it comes to moral character and self-respect; Pardew certainly recognises that the Newcastle job, which he negotiated behind the back of then-manager Chris Hughton, saved his managerial career from relative obscurity, and that he wouldn’t be offered such a prestigious role elsewhere. Still, for a self-conscious, proud if not vain man, Kinnear’s presence above him must be difficult to accept. Whatever the details relating to Pardew’s potential release from an eight-year contract, Ashley will be keen to avoid any sort of payout if he deems this possible to achieve. It is conceivable also that Kinnear will provide a ready replacement when Pardew does eventually depart. Then again, perhaps Kinnear is being used to take the flak from a manager who much of the support desire to see replaced after a dismal 2012-13.

Among other damaging short- and long-term repercussions, this week’s events and their fallout will serve to take the focus away from the vital issues of squad building and player recruitment. Newcastle desperately need attacking players; as well as replacements for any first-team members who leave for elsewhere, with last season’s vice-captain, Yohan Cabaye, strongly linked with Monaco. Tough decisions regarding, for instance, the future of Papiss Cisse – who despite some important goals had a poor last season, struggled temperamentally, and appears unlikely to thrive given the club’s set-up and in the face of hoped-for competition –  will be cast aside and transfer activity could easily become last-minute and typically destructive or insufficient. A significant number of fans have cancelled online subscriptions with the club and even their season tickets; the only respite being that, despite the tragedy of the situation, it is inarguably also very funny – absurd, but still more funny for those supporters who are intimately connected with it and follow it closely. Excelling in no facet of running a football club, Mike Ashley and his companions do excel in a comedy fallen especially low.

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Here is the audio of Kinnear’s interview with Talksport from Tuesday evening: